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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 11 Jun 2019 18:06:20 +0100 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x5BH6JNa56885340 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:06:19 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BDD511C050; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:06:19 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4A1D11C04C; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:06:16 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.80.199.191]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 11 Jun 2019 17:06:16 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Claudio Carvalho , Nayna Jain , Satheesh Rajendran Subject: [PATCH v4 2/3] powerpc/powernv: detect the secure boot mode of the system Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2019 13:06:04 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1560272765-5768-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1560272765-5768-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19061117-4275-0000-0000-000003416B9A X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19061117-4276-0000-0000-000038517DF3 Message-Id: <1560272765-5768-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-06-11_08:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1906110109 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org PowerNV secure boot defines different IMA policies based on the secure boot state of the system. This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of the system. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h | 21 ++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1904fb4a3352 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * PowerPC secure boot definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + */ +#ifndef POWERPC_SECBOOT_H +#define POWERPC_SECBOOT_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) +extern bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void); +#else +static inline bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile index 6651c742e530..6f4af607a915 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile @@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE) += ocxl.o -obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o +obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o secboot.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9199e520ebed --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * secboot.c + * - util function to get powerpc secboot state + */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void) +{ + u8 secure_boot_name[] = "SecureBoot"; + u8 setup_mode_name[] = "SetupMode"; + u8 secboot, setupmode; + unsigned long size = sizeof(secboot); + int status; + unsigned long version; + + status = opal_variable_version(&version); + if ((status != OPAL_SUCCESS) || (version != BACKEND_TC_COMPAT_V1)) { + pr_info("secboot: error retrieving compatible backend\n"); + return false; + } + + status = opal_get_variable(secure_boot_name, sizeof(secure_boot_name), + NULL, NULL, &secboot, &size); + + /* + * For now assume all failures reading the SecureBoot variable implies + * secure boot is not enabled. Later differentiate failure types. + */ + if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS) { + secboot = 0; + setupmode = 0; + goto out; + } + + size = sizeof(setupmode); + status = opal_get_variable(setup_mode_name, sizeof(setup_mode_name), + NULL, NULL, &setupmode, &size); + + /* + * Failure to read the SetupMode variable does not prevent + * secure boot mode + */ + if (status != OPAL_SUCCESS) + setupmode = 0; + +out: + if ((secboot == 0) || (setupmode == 1)) { + pr_info("secboot: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + return false; + } + + pr_info("secboot: secureboot mode enabled\n"); + return true; +} -- 2.20.1