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Biederman) To: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Christian Brauner , Linus Torvalds , Al Viro , Linux List Kernel Mailing , linux-fsdevel , Linux API , David Howells References: <20190612225431.p753mzqynxpsazb7@brauner.io> <20190613132250.u65yawzvf4voifea@brauner.io> <871rzxwcz7.fsf@xmission.com> Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:59:24 -0500 In-Reply-To: (Miklos Szeredi's message of "Thu, 13 Jun 2019 22:25:44 +0200") Message-ID: <878su5tadf.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/25.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1hbXl1-0005In-SA;;;mid=<878su5tadf.fsf@xmission.com>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=72.206.97.68;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/SZanX4kiIZau4CCkkUy83QNZgHjgF9e8= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 72.206.97.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on sa03.xmission.com X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.8 required=8.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_50, DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE,T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG,T_XMDrugObfuBody_12 autolearn=disabled version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 1.0 T_XMDrugObfuBody_12 obfuscated drug references X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Miklos Szeredi X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 9982 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.02 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 2.8 (0.0%), b_tie_ro: 1.93 (0.0%), parse: 1.07 (0.0%), extract_message_metadata: 18 (0.2%), get_uri_detail_list: 3.8 (0.0%), tests_pri_-1000: 18 (0.2%), tests_pri_-950: 1.07 (0.0%), tests_pri_-900: 0.82 (0.0%), tests_pri_-90: 27 (0.3%), check_bayes: 26 (0.3%), b_tokenize: 8 (0.1%), b_tok_get_all: 10 (0.1%), b_comp_prob: 2.8 (0.0%), b_tok_touch_all: 4.0 (0.0%), b_finish: 0.66 (0.0%), tests_pri_0: 3411 (34.2%), check_dkim_signature: 0.66 (0.0%), check_dkim_adsp: 3018 (30.2%), poll_dns_idle: 9496 (95.1%), tests_pri_10: 2.8 (0.0%), tests_pri_500: 6496 (65.1%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: Regression for MS_MOVE on kernel v5.1 X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Miklos Szeredi writes: > On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 8:35 PM Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> >> Christian Brauner writes: >> >> > On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 06:00:39PM -1000, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> >> On Wed, Jun 12, 2019 at 12:54 PM Christian Brauner wrote: >> >> > >> >> > The commit changes the internal logic to lock mounts when propagating >> >> > mounts (user+)mount namespaces and - I believe - causes do_mount_move() >> >> > to fail at: >> >> >> >> You mean 'do_move_mount()'. >> >> >> >> > if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) >> >> > goto out; >> >> > >> >> > If that's indeed the case we should either revert this commit (reverts >> >> > cleanly, just tested it) or find a fix. >> >> >> >> Hmm.. I'm not entirely sure of the logic here, and just looking at >> >> that commit 3bd045cc9c4b ("separate copying and locking mount tree on >> >> cross-userns copies") doesn't make me go "Ahh" either. >> >> >> >> Al? My gut feel is that we need to just revert, since this was in 5.1 >> >> and it's getting reasonably late in 5.2 too. But maybe you go "guys, >> >> don't be silly, this is easily fixed with this one-liner". >> > >> > David and I have been staring at that code today for a while together. >> > I think I made some sense of it. >> > One thing we weren't absolutely sure is if the old MS_MOVE behavior was >> > intentional or a bug. If it is a bug we have a problem since we quite >> > heavily rely on this... >> >> It was intentional. >> >> The only mounts that are locked in propagation are the mounts that >> propagate together. If you see the mounts come in as individuals you >> can always see/manipulate/work with the underlying mount. >> >> I can think of only a few ways for MNT_LOCKED to become set: >> a) unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) >> b) mount --rclone /path/to/mnt/tree /path/to/propagation/point >> c) mount --move /path/to/mnt/tree /path/to/propgation/point >> >> Nothing in the target namespace should be locked on the propgation point >> but all of the new mounts that came across as a unit should be locked >> together. > > Locked together means the root of the new mount tree doesn't have > MNT_LOCKED set, but all mounts below do have MNT_LOCKED, right? > > Isn't the bug here that the root mount gets MNT_LOCKED as well? Yes, and the code to remove MNT_LOCKED is still sitting there in propogate_one right after it calls copy_tree. It should be a trivial matter of moving that change to after the lock_mnt_tree call. Now that I have been elightened about anonymous mount namespaces I am suspecting that we want to take the user_namespace of the anonymous namespace into account when deciding to lock the mounts. >> Then it breaking is definitely a regression that needs to be fixed. >> >> I believe the problematic change as made because the new mount >> api allows attaching floating mounts. Or that was the plan last I >> looked. Those floating mounts don't have a mnt_ns so will result >> in a NULL pointer dereference when they are attached. > > Well, it's called anonymous namespace. So there *is* an mnt_ns, and > its lifetime is bound to the file returned by fsmount(). Interesting. That has changed since I last saw the patches. Below is what will probably be a straight forward fix for the regression. Eric diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index ffb13f0562b0..a39edeecbc46 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2105,6 +2105,7 @@ static int attach_recursive_mnt(struct mount *source_mnt, /* Notice when we are propagating across user namespaces */ if (child->mnt_parent->mnt_ns->user_ns != user_ns) lock_mnt_tree(child); + child->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED; commit_tree(child); } put_mountpoint(smp); diff --git a/fs/pnode.c b/fs/pnode.c index 7ea6cfb65077..012be405fec0 100644 --- a/fs/pnode.c +++ b/fs/pnode.c @@ -262,7 +262,6 @@ static int propagate_one(struct mount *m) child = copy_tree(last_source, last_source->mnt.mnt_root, type); if (IS_ERR(child)) return PTR_ERR(child); - child->mnt.mnt_flags &= ~MNT_LOCKED; mnt_set_mountpoint(m, mp, child); last_dest = m; last_source = child;