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Date:   Thu, 13 Jun 2019 16:17:55 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>
Cc:     Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in
 SELinux
Message-ID: <20190613231755.GD18385@linux.intel.com>
References: <cover.1560131039.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
 <a382d46f66756e13929ca9244479dd9f689c470e.1560131039.git.cedric.xing@intel.com>
 <b6f099cd-c0eb-d5cf-847d-27a15ac5ceaf@tycho.nsa.gov>
 <20190611220243.GB3416@linux.intel.com>
 <8d99d8fb-a921-286a-8cf0-cd522e09b37c@tycho.nsa.gov>
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On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:03:24PM -0700, Xing, Cedric wrote:
> > From: Stephen Smalley [mailto:sds@tycho.nsa.gov]
> > Sent: Thursday, June 13, 2019 10:02 AM
> > 
> > > My RFC series[1] implements #1.  My understanding is that Andy
> > > (Lutomirski) prefers #2.  Cedric's RFC series implements #3.
> > >
> > > Perhaps the easiest way to make forward progress is to rule out the
> > > options we absolutely *don't* want by focusing on the potentially
> > > blocking issue with each option:
> > >
> > >    #1 - SGX UAPI funkiness
> > >
> > >    #2 - Auditing complexity, potential enclave lock contention
> > >
> > >    #3 - Pushing SGX details into LSMs and complexity of kernel
> > > implementation
> > >
> > >
> > > [1]
> > > https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606021145.12604-1-sean.j.christopherson
> > > @intel.com
> > 
> > Given the complexity tradeoff, what is the clear motivating example for
> > why #1 isn't the obvious choice? That the enclave loader has no way of
> > knowing a priori whether the enclave will require W->X or WX?  But
> > aren't we better off requiring enclaves to be explicitly marked as
> > needing such so that we can make a more informed decision about whether
> > to load them in the first place?
> 
> Are you asking this question at a) page granularity, b) file granularity or
> c) enclave (potentially comprised of multiple executable files) granularity?
> 
> #b is what we have on regular executable files and shared objects (i.e.
> FILE__EXECMOD). We all know how to do that.
> 
> #c is kind of new but could be done via some proxy file (e.g. sigstruct file)
> hence reduced to #b.
> 
> #a is problematic. It'd require compilers/linkers to generate such
> information, and proper executable image file format to carry that
> information, to be eventually picked up the loader. SELinux doesn't have
> PAGE__EXECMOD I guess is because it is generally considered impractical.
> 
> Option #1 however requires #a because the driver doesn't track which page was
> loaded from which file, otherwise it can no longer be qualified "simple". Or
> we could just implement #c, which will make all options simpler. But I guess
> #b is still preferred, to be aligned with what SELinux is enforcing today on
> regular memory pages.o

Option #1 doesn't require (a).  The checks will happen for every page,
but in the RFCs I sent, the policies are still attached to files and
processes, i.e. (b).