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From:   Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Date:   Fri, 14 Jun 2019 11:28:31 +0530
Message-ID: <CAFA6WYN0u1nrxp1rok+GMi_wVH44FD9QKhoqOPvUNC0_f+kULw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/7] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc:     keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>, corbet@lwn.net,
        dhowells@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>,
        linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        tee-dev@lists.linaro.org
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On Thu, 13 Jun 2019 at 22:10, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> On 6/13/2019 3:30 AM, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
> > to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is
> > an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
> >
> > This series also adds some TEE features like:
>
> Please expand the acronym TEE on first use. That will
> help people who don't work with it on a daily basis
> understand what you're going on about.
>

Sure will take care of this. BTW, its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

-Sumit

> >
> > Patch #1, #2 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
> >
> > Patch #3 enables support for private kernel login method required for
> > cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly access
> > TEE service to retrieve trusted key contents.
> >
> > Rest of the patches from #4 to #7 adds support for TEE based trusted keys.
> >
> > This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based pseudo TA which can be
> > found here [1].
> >
> > Looking forward to your valuable feedback/suggestions.
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3082
> >
> > Sumit Garg (7):
> >   tee: optee: allow kernel pages to register as shm
> >   tee: enable support to register kernel memory
> >   tee: add private login method for kernel clients
> >   KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
> >   KEYS: encrypted: Allow TEE based trusted master keys
> >   doc: keys: Document usage of TEE based Trusted Keys
> >   MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
> >
> >  Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst      |  93 +++++
> >  MAINTAINERS                                      |   9 +
> >  drivers/tee/optee/call.c                         |   7 +
> >  drivers/tee/tee_core.c                           |   6 +
> >  drivers/tee/tee_shm.c                            |  16 +-
> >  include/keys/tee_trusted.h                       |  84 ++++
> >  include/keys/trusted-type.h                      |   1 +
> >  include/linux/tee_drv.h                          |   1 +
> >  include/uapi/linux/tee.h                         |   2 +
> >  security/keys/Kconfig                            |   3 +
> >  security/keys/Makefile                           |   3 +
> >  security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c |  10 +-
> >  security/keys/tee_trusted.c                      | 506 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  13 files changed, 737 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/tee-trusted.rst
> >  create mode 100644 include/keys/tee_trusted.h
> >  create mode 100644 security/keys/tee_trusted.c
> >