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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id y12si305651pgr.329.2019.06.18.07.09.49; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 07:10:05 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729370AbfFROJj (ORCPT + 99 others); Tue, 18 Jun 2019 10:09:39 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:7043 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726248AbfFROJi (ORCPT ); Tue, 18 Jun 2019 10:09:38 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 18 Jun 2019 07:09:37 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.63,389,1557212400"; d="scan'208";a="243002896" Received: from oamaslek-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.251.9.224]) ([10.251.9.224]) by orsmga001.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 18 Jun 2019 07:09:37 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC 45/62] mm: Add the encrypt_mprotect() system call for MKTME To: Peter Zijlstra , Kai Huang Cc: Andy Lutomirski , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Andrew Morton , X86 ML , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Borislav Petkov , David Howells , Kees Cook , Jacob Pan , Alison Schofield , Linux-MM , kvm list , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Tom Lendacky References: <3c658cce-7b7e-7d45-59a0-e17dae986713@intel.com> <5cbfa2da-ba2e-ed91-d0e8-add67753fc12@intel.com> <1560816342.5187.63.camel@linux.intel.com> <1560821746.5187.82.camel@linux.intel.com> <1560824611.5187.100.camel@linux.intel.com> <20190618091246.GM3436@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> From: Dave Hansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= mQINBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABtEVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT6JAjgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lcuQINBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABiQIfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y Message-ID: <2ec26c05-7c57-d0e0-a628-94d581b96b63@intel.com> Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 07:09:36 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190618091246.GM3436@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 6/18/19 2:12 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 02:23:31PM +1200, Kai Huang wrote: >> Assuming I am understanding the context correctly, yes from this perspective it seems having >> sys_encrypt is annoying, and having ENCRYPT_ME should be better. But Dave said "nobody is going to >> do what you suggest in the ptr1/ptr2 example"? > > You have to phrase that as: 'nobody who knows what he's doing is going > to do that', which leaves lots of people and fuzzers. > > Murphy states that if it is possible, someone _will_ do it. And this > being something that causes severe data corruption on persistent > storage,... I actually think it's not a big deal at all to avoid the corruption that would occur if it were allowed. But, if you're even asking to map the same data with two different keys, you're *asking* for data corruption. What we're doing here is continuing to preserve cache coherency and ensuring an early failure. We'd need two rules: 1. A page must not be faulted into a VMA if the page's page_keyid() is not consistent with the VMA's 2. Upon changing the VMA's KeyID, all underlying PTEs must either be checked or zapped. If the rules are broken, we SIGBUS. Andy's suggestion has the same basic requirements. But, with his scheme, the error can be to the ioctl() instead of in the form of a SIGBUS. I guess that makes the fuzzers' lives a bit easier. BTW, note that we don't have any problems with the current anonymous implementation and fork() because we zap at the encryption syscall.