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Date:   Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:19:25 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH V33 14/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is
 locked down
From:   Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To:     jmorris@namei.org
Cc:     linux-security@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, x86@kernel.org
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Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

Writing to MSRs should not be allowed if the kernel is locked down, since
it could lead to execution of arbitrary code in kernel mode.  Based on a
patch by Kees Cook.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/msr.c        | 8 ++++++++
 include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
index 4588414e2561..72f0ed5a93c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/msr.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/notifier.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -84,6 +85,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int err = 0;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
 
+	if (security_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (count % 8)
 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
 
@@ -135,6 +139,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (security_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_MSR)) {
+			err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		err = wrmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu(cpu, regs);
 		if (err)
 			break;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 59f0ac7adfa6..81c0968e485f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION,
 	LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS,
 	LOCKDOWN_IOPORT,
+	LOCKDOWN_MSR,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 6e426887bb23..a01301972290 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
 	[LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
+	[LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog