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Date:   Thu, 20 Jun 2019 18:19:16 -0700
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Message-Id: <20190621011941.186255-6-matthewgarrett@google.com>
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References: <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH V33 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is
 locked down
From:   Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
To:     jmorris@namei.org
Cc:     linux-security@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, x86@kernel.org
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Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
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From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.

Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.

Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
---
 drivers/char/mem.c           | 4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h     | 1 +
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 +
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index b08dc50f9f26..1ee6cff43eea 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/uio.h>
-
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA64
 # include <linux/efi.h>
@@ -786,6 +786,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
 
 static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	if (security_is_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM))
+		return -EPERM;
 	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a7612b03b42a..034a8d54687f 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum lsm_event {
 enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_NONE,
 	LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+	LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM,
 	LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 08abd7e6609b..43a049b3b66a 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
 static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
 	[LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
 	[LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
+	[LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
 	[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
 	[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog