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From:   Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Date:   Fri, 21 Jun 2019 17:26:16 +0200
Message-ID: <CAG_fn=VCF+sXQE3VxvBRa_a97rX8tVGSTXQsk9uiOH=q6Rg9Pw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v2] mm/page_alloc: fix a false memory corruption
To:     Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
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On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 4:56 PM Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
>
> On Fri, 2019-06-21 at 16:37 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 2:26 PM Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, 2019-06-21 at 12:39 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 3:01 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> w=
rote:
> > > > >
> > > > > On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 04:46:06PM -0400, Qian Cai wrote:
> > > > > > The linux-next commit "mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=3D=
1 and
> > > > > > init_on_free=3D1 boot options" [1] introduced a false positive =
when
> > > > > > init_on_free=3D1 and page_poison=3Don, due to the page_poison e=
xpects the
> > > > > > pattern 0xaa when allocating pages which were overwritten by
> > > > > > init_on_free=3D1 with 0.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Fix it by switching the order between kernel_init_free_pages() =
and
> > > > > > kernel_poison_pages() in free_pages_prepare().
> > > > >
> > > > > Cool; this seems like the right approach. Alexander, what do you =
think?
> > > >
> > > > Can using init_on_free together with page_poison bring any value at=
 all?
> > > > Isn't it better to decide at boot time which of the two features we=
're
> > > > going to enable?
> > >
> > > I think the typical use case is people are using init_on_free=3D1, an=
d then
> > > decide
> > > to debug something by enabling page_poison=3Don. Definitely, don't wa=
nt
> > > init_on_free=3D1 to disable page_poison as the later has additional c=
hecking
> > > in
> > > the allocation time to make sure that poison pattern set in the free =
time is
> > > still there.
> >
> > In addition to information lifetime reduction the idea of init_on_free
> > is to ensure the newly allocated objects have predictable contents.
> > Therefore it's handy (although not strictly necessary) to keep them
> > zero-initialized regardless of other boot-time flags.
> > Right now free_pages_prezeroed() relies on that, though this can be cha=
nged.
> >
> > On the other hand, since page_poison already initializes freed memory,
> > we can probably make want_init_on_free() return false in that case to
> > avoid extra initialization.
> >
> > Side note: if we make it possible to switch betwen 0x00 and 0xAA in
> > init_on_free mode, we can merge it with page_poison, performing the
> > initialization depending on a boot-time flag and doing heavyweight
> > checks under a separate config.
>
> Yes, that would be great which will reduce code duplication.
I suggest we disable init_on_alloc/init_on_free under
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING now then and work towards deduplicating this
code in further patch series.


--=20
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

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