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Date:   Wed, 26 Jun 2019 14:20:16 +0200
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Message-Id: <20190626122018.171606-2-elver@google.com>
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References: <20190626122018.171606-1-elver@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/4] mm/kasan: Introduce __kasan_check_{read,write}
From:   Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To:     aryabinin@virtuozzo.com, dvyukov@google.com, glider@google.com,
        andreyknvl@google.com
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

This introduces __kasan_check_{read,write} which return a bool if the
access was valid or not. __kasan_check functions may be used from
anywhere, even compilation units that disable instrumentation
selectively. For consistency, kasan_check_{read,write} have been changed
to also return a bool.

This change eliminates the need for the __KASAN_INTERNAL definition.

Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
---
 include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 mm/kasan/common.c            | 14 ++++++--------
 mm/kasan/generic.c           | 13 +++++++------
 mm/kasan/kasan.h             | 10 +++++++++-
 mm/kasan/tags.c              | 12 +++++++-----
 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
index a61dc075e2ce..b8cf8a7cad34 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h
@@ -2,14 +2,35 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_KASAN_CHECKS_H
 #define _LINUX_KASAN_CHECKS_H
 
-#if defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) || defined(__KASAN_INTERNAL)
-void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
-void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
+/*
+ * __kasan_check_*: Always available when KASAN is enabled. This may be used
+ * even in compilation units that selectively disable KASAN, but must use KASAN
+ * to validate access to an address.   Never use these in header files!
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
+bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size);
 #else
-static inline void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
-{ }
-static inline void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
-{ }
+static inline bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return true; }
+static inline bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return true; }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * kasan_check_*: Only available when the particular compilation unit has KASAN
+ * instrumentation enabled. May be used in header files.
+ */
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__
+static inline bool kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return __kasan_check_read(p, size); }
+static inline bool kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return __kasan_check_read(p, size); }
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return true; }
+static inline bool kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+{ return true; }
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 242fdc01aaa9..2277b82902d8 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
  *
  */
 
-#define __KASAN_INTERNAL
-
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
@@ -89,17 +87,17 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void)
 	current->kasan_depth--;
 }
 
-void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
 {
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
+	return check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_read);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_read);
 
-void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
+bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size)
 {
-	check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
+	return check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_check_write);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write);
 
 #undef memset
 void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 504c79363a34..616f9dd82d12 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -166,29 +166,30 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(unsigned long addr, size_t size)
 	return memory_is_poisoned_n(addr, size);
 }
 
-static __always_inline void check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
+static __always_inline bool check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
 						size_t size, bool write,
 						unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
 	if (unlikely(size == 0))
-		return;
+		return true;
 
 	if (unlikely((void *)addr <
 		kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
 		kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
-		return;
+		return false;
 	}
 
 	if (likely(!memory_is_poisoned(addr, size)))
-		return;
+		return true;
 
 	kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+	return false;
 }
 
-void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
+bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
-	check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
+	return check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
 }
 
 void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 3ce956efa0cb..e62ea45d02e3 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -123,7 +123,15 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
 
 void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value);
 
-void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
+/**
+ * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access.
+ * @addr: the accessed address
+ * @size: the accessed size
+ * @write: true if access is a write access
+ * @ret_ip: return address
+ * @return: true if access was valid, false if invalid
+ */
+bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip);
 
 void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c
index 63fca3172659..0e987c9ca052 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/tags.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr)
 	return reset_tag(addr);
 }
 
-void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
+bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 				unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
 	u8 tag;
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 	void *untagged_addr;
 
 	if (unlikely(size == 0))
-		return;
+		return true;
 
 	tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
 
@@ -106,22 +106,24 @@ void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write,
 	 * set to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF)).
 	 */
 	if (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
-		return;
+		return true;
 
 	untagged_addr = reset_tag((const void *)addr);
 	if (unlikely(untagged_addr <
 			kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) {
 		kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
-		return;
+		return false;
 	}
 	shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
 	shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1);
 	for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) {
 		if (*shadow != tag) {
 			kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
-			return;
+			return false;
 		}
 	}
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size)					\
-- 
2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog