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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id p23si16565299pgj.356.2019.06.26.07.28.15; Wed, 26 Jun 2019 07:28:31 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@google.com header.s=20161025 header.b=b1IaFK1m; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=REJECT sp=REJECT dis=NONE) header.from=google.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728028AbfFZO2B (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 26 Jun 2019 10:28:01 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f201.google.com ([209.85.215.201]:34046 "EHLO mail-pg1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725958AbfFZO2A (ORCPT ); Wed, 26 Jun 2019 10:28:00 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f201.google.com with SMTP id x19so1492776pgx.1 for ; Wed, 26 Jun 2019 07:28:00 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=Rln2FP6BOxdiVf8wORphr5UbX/lGN9PNgnvsQm0pxfA=; b=b1IaFK1mLKquMHrwUdq8QS9ugryrRPvq91UQ0Uq6LFY+c2JG0h8vOnQRBq9Y4iBHrd 17LsoajCwmnclKkY2LGLzmZK9jswwvQ8KphGCaAcqDw3Y5nANf73MjW7Cdyza3VWGCrS zpMj+JpcmgUaOeIauUqJJoduT7cgP35I/T6J0lq7MXm+xBM7VbsrPucsTC/qhyGJNYqj Jq0SH14PhfI7POH8+ntsXeZlQLTimCrlHvzHDw1oHqI66dDTIlPptw8JxI9T+XhR2DNf D9MpYcQLyK6spvA7kZWNLDDdjpLaHgbAIKd/hbGa6ghj3SUJRGWYatvWEVeUYYzWX5l9 DKaA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=Rln2FP6BOxdiVf8wORphr5UbX/lGN9PNgnvsQm0pxfA=; b=Xj6TZHVIJLt4RAtSN7UxjrA9d8hkA+LXNf7G/yuXTAIN4eoZr009RFKPQECWmjGkrm su4u65cJWxVHjfaRaBw8GqQBNVLHE2ycj+M04JZV844H7ZGWcuq7HUWB/0C5IjIOq1nW zKTqPY1S8vxsa2AJk6r/G3sIBvkLZBtqGJ/Q3hnkz8zC28NSm44tEQNTvgNdjJJ/hb5N M5KmcSjt93hUs5fM/xG0wbbLq6uJkLpZ8ftBOhCCaY6/MivaSIMKqwboOJdujXKoirSo yv81I0Eie8UO4sZLKzMf5uWtl2G/nxsnRdomyZ9kFKMzL6yDQJow4lDC5pF/rNHt4C3i byOg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXWRsjtOAlXGtTW6NI9lgERPWlL/iBDX+CD2ZIRacQz0IW+zgkJ YhkBgWagEYMEzDbb585V3fcXuQSIEg== X-Received: by 2002:a65:4387:: with SMTP id m7mr3168635pgp.287.1561559279316; Wed, 26 Jun 2019 07:27:59 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 16:20:11 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20190626142014.141844-1-elver@google.com> Message-Id: <20190626142014.141844-3-elver@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190626142014.141844-1-elver@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] mm/kasan: Change kasan_check_{read,write} to return boolean From: Marco Elver To: elver@google.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin , Dmitry Vyukov , Alexander Potapenko , Andrey Konovalov , Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , Mark Rutland , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This changes {,__}kasan_check_{read,write} functions to return a boolean denoting if the access was valid or not. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver Cc: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Andrey Konovalov Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org --- v3: * Fix Formatting and split introduction of __kasan_check_* and returning bool into 2 patches. --- include/linux/kasan-checks.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- mm/kasan/common.c | 8 ++++---- mm/kasan/generic.c | 13 +++++++------ mm/kasan/kasan.h | 10 +++++++++- mm/kasan/tags.c | 12 +++++++----- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h index 19a0175d2452..2c7f0b6307b2 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan-checks.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan-checks.h @@ -8,13 +8,17 @@ * to validate access to an address. Never use these in header files! */ #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN -void __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size); -void __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size); +bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size); +bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size); #else -static inline void __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) -{ } -static inline void __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) -{ } +static inline bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + return true; +} +static inline bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + return true; +} #endif /* @@ -22,19 +26,23 @@ static inline void __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size * instrumentation enabled. May be used in header files. */ #ifdef __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ -static inline void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +static inline bool kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - __kasan_check_read(p, size); + return __kasan_check_read(p, size); } -static inline void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +static inline bool kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - __kasan_check_read(p, size); + return __kasan_check_read(p, size); } #else -static inline void kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) -{ } -static inline void kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) -{ } +static inline bool kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + return true; +} +static inline bool kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +{ + return true; +} #endif #endif diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 6bada42cc152..2277b82902d8 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -87,15 +87,15 @@ void kasan_disable_current(void) current->kasan_depth--; } -void __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +bool __kasan_check_read(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_); + return check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, false, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_read); -void __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) +bool __kasan_check_write(const volatile void *p, unsigned int size) { - check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_); + return check_memory_region((unsigned long)p, size, true, _RET_IP_); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c index 504c79363a34..616f9dd82d12 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -166,29 +166,30 @@ static __always_inline bool memory_is_poisoned(unsigned long addr, size_t size) return memory_is_poisoned_n(addr, size); } -static __always_inline void check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, +static __always_inline bool check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { if (unlikely(size == 0)) - return; + return true; if (unlikely((void *)addr < kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); - return; + return false; } if (likely(!memory_is_poisoned(addr, size))) - return; + return true; kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); + return false; } -void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, +bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { - check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip); + return check_memory_region_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip); } void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache) diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h index 3ce956efa0cb..e62ea45d02e3 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h @@ -123,7 +123,15 @@ static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr) void kasan_poison_shadow(const void *address, size_t size, u8 value); -void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, +/** + * check_memory_region - Check memory region, and report if invalid access. + * @addr: the accessed address + * @size: the accessed size + * @write: true if access is a write access + * @ret_ip: return address + * @return: true if access was valid, false if invalid + */ +bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip); void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size); diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c index 63fca3172659..0e987c9ca052 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void *kasan_reset_tag(const void *addr) return reset_tag(addr); } -void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, +bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, unsigned long ret_ip) { u8 tag; @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, void *untagged_addr; if (unlikely(size == 0)) - return; + return true; tag = get_tag((const void *)addr); @@ -106,22 +106,24 @@ void check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, * set to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF)). */ if (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL) - return; + return true; untagged_addr = reset_tag((const void *)addr); if (unlikely(untagged_addr < kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); - return; + return false; } shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr); shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + size - 1); for (shadow = shadow_first; shadow <= shadow_last; shadow++) { if (*shadow != tag) { kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); - return; + return false; } } + + return true; } #define DEFINE_HWASAN_LOAD_STORE(size) \ -- 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog