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Date:   Tue, 2 Jul 2019 13:39:05 -0400
From:   Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com>, edwintorok@gmail.com,
        mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/stacktrace: Do not access user space memory
 unnecessarily
Message-ID: <20190702133905.1482b87e@gandalf.local.home>
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        <20190702072821.GX3419@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
        <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907021400350.1802@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
        <20190702113355.5be9ebfe@gandalf.local.home>
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On Tue, 2 Jul 2019 11:33:55 -0400
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> wrote:

> On Tue, 2 Jul 2019 16:14:05 +0200 (CEST)
> Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, 2 Jul 2019, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> >   
> > > On Tue, Jul 02, 2019 at 02:31:51PM +0900, Eiichi Tsukata wrote:    
> > > > Put the boundary check before it accesses user space to prevent unnecessary
> > > > access which might crash the machine.
> > > > 
> > > > Especially, ftrace preemptirq/irq_disable event with user stack trace
> > > > option can trigger SEGV in pid 1 which leads to panic.    
> 
> Note, I'm only able to trigger this crash with the irq_disable event.
> The irq_enable and preempt_disable/enable events work just fine. This
> leads me to believe that the TRACE_IRQS_OFF macro (which uses a thunk
> trampoline) may have some issues and is probably the place to look at.

I figured it out.

It's another "corruption of the cr2" register issue. The following
patch makes the issue go away. I'm not suggesting that we use this
patch, but it shows where the bug lies.

IIRC, there was patches posted before that fixed this issue. I'll go
look to see if I can dig them up. Was it Joel that sent them?

-- Steve

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S
index be36bf4e0957..dd79256badb2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/thunk_64.S
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
 	THUNK trace_hardirqs_on_thunk,trace_hardirqs_on_caller,1
-	THUNK trace_hardirqs_off_thunk,trace_hardirqs_off_caller,1
+	THUNK trace_hardirqs_off_thunk,trace_hardirqs_off_caller_cr2,1
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 46df4c6aae46..b42ca3fc569d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1555,3 +1555,13 @@ do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
 	exception_exit(prev_state);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_page_fault);
+
+void trace_hardirqs_off_caller(unsigned long addr);
+
+void notrace trace_hardirqs_off_caller_cr2(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long address = read_cr2(); /* Get the faulting address */
+
+	trace_hardirqs_off_caller(addr);
+	write_cr2(address);
+}