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Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: allow module init if TPM is inactive or
 deactivated
From:   James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
        jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jgg@ziepe.ca
Cc:     linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, crazyt2019+lml@gmail.com,
        tyhicks@canonical.com, nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
        silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com
Date:   Mon, 08 Jul 2019 13:34:59 -0700
In-Reply-To: <20190705163735.11539-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
References: <20190705163735.11539-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
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On Fri, 2019-07-05 at 18:37 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Commit c78719203fc6 ("KEYS: trusted: allow trusted.ko to initialize
> w/o a
> TPM") allows the trusted module to be loaded even a TPM is not found
> to
> avoid module dependency problems.
> 
> Unfortunately, this does not completely solve the issue, as there
> could be
> a case where a TPM is found but is not functional (the TPM commands
> return
> an error). Specifically, after the tpm_chip structure is returned by
> tpm_default_chip() in init_trusted(), the execution terminates after
> init_digests() returns -EFAULT (due to the fact that tpm_get_random()
> returns a positive value, but less than TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE).
> 
> This patch fixes the issue by ignoring the TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED and
> TPM_ERR_DISABLED errors.
> 
> Fixes: 240730437deb ("KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip
> structure...")
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h  | 2 --
>  include/linux/tpm.h     | 3 +++
>  security/keys/trusted.c | 6 +++++-
>  3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> index e503ffc3aa39..a216ac396711 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> @@ -54,8 +54,6 @@ enum tpm_addr {
>  
>  #define TPM_WARN_RETRY          0x800
>  #define TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST 0x802
> -#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED     0x6
> -#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED        0x7
>  #define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38
>  
>  #define TPM_HEADER_SIZE		10
> diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> index 53c0ea9ec9df..efd3ccbb6aee 100644
> --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
>  #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
>  #define TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
>  
> +#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED     0x6
> +#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED        0x7
> +
>  struct tpm_chip;
>  struct trusted_key_payload;
>  struct trusted_key_options;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
> index 9a94672e7adc..430d85090b3b 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
> @@ -389,6 +389,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
>  	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> +	/* This can happen if the TPM is inactive. */
> +	if (!digests)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
>  	return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -1233,7 +1237,7 @@ static int __init init_digests(void)
>  	int i;
>  
>  	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);

Not a criticism of your patch, but can we please stop doing this. 
Single random number sources are horrendously bad practice because it
gives an attacker a single target to subvert.  We should ensure the TPM
is plugged into the kernel RNG as a source and then take randomness
from the mixed pool so it's harder for an attacker because they have to
subvert all our sources to predict what came out.

James