Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67;
Date:   Wed, 10 Jul 2019 16:22:51 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
cc:     Xi Ruoyao <xry111@mengyan1223.wang>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
        Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>,
        Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@intel.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>,
        Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/topology changes for v5.3
In-Reply-To: <20190710134433.GN3402@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Message-ID: <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1907101621050.5899@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
References: <CAHk-=wh7NChJP+WkaDd3qCz847Fq4NdQ6z6m-VFpbr3py_EknQ@mail.gmail.com> <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907100023020.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907100039540.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907100115220.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
 <201907091727.91CC6C72D8@keescook> <1ad2de95e694a29909801d022fe2d556df9a4bd5.camel@mengyan1223.wang> <cb6d381ed7cd0bf732ae9d8f30c806b849b0f94b.camel@mengyan1223.wang> <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907101404570.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1907101425290.5899@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
 <768463eb26a2feb0fcc374fd7f9cc28b96976917.camel@mengyan1223.wang> <20190710134433.GN3402@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
User-Agent: Alpine 2.21 (LSU 202 2017-01-01)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org
Precedence: bulk

On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Peter Zijlstra wrote:

> If we mark the key as RO after init, and then try and modify the key to
> link module usage sites, things might go bang as described.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> index 27d7864e7252..5bf7a8354da2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
>  }
>  
> -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cr_pinning);

Good catch, I guess that is going to fix it.

At the same time though, it sort of destroys the original intent of Kees' 
patch, right? The exploits will just have to call static_key_disable() 
prior to calling native_write_cr4() again, and the protection is gone.

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs