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Date:   Thu, 11 Jul 2019 10:01:34 +0200
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc:     Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
        Xi Ruoyao <xry111@mengyan1223.wang>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
        Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
        Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>,
        Erik Schmauss <erik.schmauss@intel.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/topology changes for v5.3
Message-ID: <20190711080134.GT3402@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>
References: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907100115220.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
 <201907091727.91CC6C72D8@keescook>
 <1ad2de95e694a29909801d022fe2d556df9a4bd5.camel@mengyan1223.wang>
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 <alpine.DEB.2.21.1907101404570.1758@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
 <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1907101425290.5899@cbobk.fhfr.pm>
 <768463eb26a2feb0fcc374fd7f9cc28b96976917.camel@mengyan1223.wang>
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On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 07:11:19AM +0000, Nadav Amit wrote:
> > On Jul 10, 2019, at 7:22 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > 
> >> If we mark the key as RO after init, and then try and modify the key to
> >> link module usage sites, things might go bang as described.
> >> 
> >> Thanks!
> >> 
> >> 
> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> index 27d7864e7252..5bf7a8354da2 100644
> >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> >> @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> >> 	cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
> >> }
> >> 
> >> -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
> >> +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cr_pinning);
> > 
> > Good catch, I guess that is going to fix it.
> > 
> > At the same time though, it sort of destroys the original intent of Kees' 
> > patch, right? The exploits will just have to call static_key_disable() 
> > prior to calling native_write_cr4() again, and the protection is gone.
> 
> Even with DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(), I presume you can just call
> set_memory_rw(), make the page that holds the key writable, and then call
> static_key_disable(), followed by a call to native_write_cr4().

Or call text_poke_bp() with the right set of arguments.