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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id v16si13865435pfe.39.2019.07.14.08.24.15; Sun, 14 Jul 2019 08:24:34 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=0Cu3LLMy; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728565AbfGNPXR (ORCPT + 99 others); Sun, 14 Jul 2019 11:23:17 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33510 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726783AbfGNPXR (ORCPT ); Sun, 14 Jul 2019 11:23:17 -0400 Received: from localhost (d192-24-91-215.try.wideopenwest.com [24.192.215.91]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 20557205F4; Sun, 14 Jul 2019 15:23:16 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1563117796; bh=vKxZjK6XQ4xFvpdZPzxOyvZtQo9jmMou4Hq4FfVgY1Y=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=0Cu3LLMyoHyzBiqSyU1BUzfK5WiotNftdNq4m8I3eGu/DDa2y4+56JasrHSWg1s1p FUb9RmJnvG6gb6kPD20EDQZyqMPdCglHJQ8VQ0bS+V8r/fsi4Iyi1GYY8eVEUFpEf1 wpWx5n7QetKx9NbrtUttYx1W2TUMHDX6Pe2JRc6o= From: Andy Lutomirski To: LKML Cc: x86@kernel.org, Borislav Petkov , Peter Zijlstra , Andy Lutomirski , Nadav Amit , Stephane Eranian , Feng Tang , Andrew Cooper Subject: [PATCH] x86/apic: Initialize TPR to block interrupts 16-31 Date: Sun, 14 Jul 2019 08:23:14 -0700 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The APIC, per spec, is fundamentally confused and thinks that interrupt vectors 16-31 are valid. This makes no sense -- the CPU reserves vectors 0-31 for exceptions (faults, traps, etc). Obviously, no device should actually produce an interrupt with vector 16-31, but we can improve robustness by setting the APIC TPR class to 1, which will prevent delivery of an interrupt with a vector below 32. Note: this is *not* intended as a security measure against attackers who control malicious hardware. Any PCI or similar hardware that can be controlled by an attacker MUST be behind a functional IOMMU that remaps interrupts. The purpose of this patch is to reduce the chance that a certain class of device malfunctions crashes the kernel in hard-to-debug ways. Cc: Nadav Amit Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Feng Tang Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski --- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index 177aa8ef2afa..ff31322f8839 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -1531,11 +1531,14 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void) #endif /* - * Set Task Priority to 'accept all'. We never change this - * later on. + * Set Task Priority to 'accept all except vectors 0-31'. An APIC + * vector in the 16-31 range could be delivered if TPR == 0, but we + * would think it's an exception and terrible things will happen. We + * never change this later on. */ value = apic_read(APIC_TASKPRI); value &= ~APIC_TPRI_MASK; + value |= 0x10; apic_write(APIC_TASKPRI, value); apic_pending_intr_clear(); -- 2.21.0