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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 18 Jul 2019 04:29:39 +0100 Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.110]) by b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x6I3TcUT49086816 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 18 Jul 2019 03:29:38 GMT Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 84326AE05F; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 03:29:38 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94DE3AE05C; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 03:29:34 +0000 (GMT) Received: from morokweng.localdomain.com (unknown [9.85.129.123]) by b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 03:29:34 +0000 (GMT) From: Thiago Jung Bauermann To: x86@kernel.org Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Christoph Hellwig , Marek Szyprowski , Robin Murphy , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Alexey Dobriyan , Thomas Lendacky , Halil Pasic , Mike Anderson , Ram Pai , Thiago Jung Bauermann Subject: [PATCH v3 5/6] fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch code Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 00:28:57 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0 In-Reply-To: <20190718032858.28744-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> References: <20190718032858.28744-1-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19071803-0072-0000-0000-0000044A8A6A X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00011449; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000286; SDB=6.01233737; UDB=6.00650106; IPR=6.01015064; MB=3.00027770; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-07-18 03:29:43 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19071803-0073-0000-0000-00004CBADC98 Message-Id: <20190718032858.28744-6-bauerman@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-07-18_01:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=38 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1907180037 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense. To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c. Also, remove the export for sev_active() since it's only used in files that won't be built as modules. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann --- arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 1 - fs/proc/vmcore.c | 8 ++++---- include/linux/crash_dump.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/mem_encrypt.h | 1 - 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c index 22369dd5de3b..045e82e8945b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash_dump_64.c @@ -70,3 +70,8 @@ ssize_t copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, { return __copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, csize, offset, userbuf, true); } + +ssize_t elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) +{ + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active()); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 7139f2f43955..b1e823441093 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -349,7 +349,6 @@ bool sev_active(void) { return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(sev_active); /* Override for DMA direct allocation check - ARCH_HAS_FORCE_DMA_UNENCRYPTED */ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c index 57957c91c6df..ca1f20bedd8c 100644 --- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c +++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c @@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ static int pfn_is_ram(unsigned long pfn) } /* Reads a page from the oldmem device from given offset. */ -static ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, - u64 *ppos, int userbuf, - bool encrypted) +ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, + u64 *ppos, int userbuf, + bool encrypted) { unsigned long pfn, offset; size_t nr_bytes; @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ void __weak elfcorehdr_free(unsigned long long addr) */ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) { - return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sev_active()); + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, false); } /* diff --git a/include/linux/crash_dump.h b/include/linux/crash_dump.h index f774c5eb9e3c..4664fc1871de 100644 --- a/include/linux/crash_dump.h +++ b/include/linux/crash_dump.h @@ -115,4 +115,18 @@ static inline int vmcore_add_device_dump(struct vmcoredd_data *data) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE_DEVICE_DUMP */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE +ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, + u64 *ppos, int userbuf, + bool encrypted); +#else +static inline ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, + u64 *ppos, int userbuf, + bool encrypted) +{ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE */ + #endif /* LINUX_CRASHDUMP_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h index 0c5b0ff9eb29..5c4a18a91f89 100644 --- a/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/include/linux/mem_encrypt.h @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #else /* !CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */ static inline bool mem_encrypt_active(void) { return false; } -static inline bool sev_active(void) { return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MEM_ENCRYPT */