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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id w188si16329800pfd.283.2019.07.24.23.02.52; Wed, 24 Jul 2019 23:03:09 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=hjOPIiu0; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387513AbfGYFqQ (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 25 Jul 2019 01:46:16 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:33742 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2405324AbfGYFqO (ORCPT ); Thu, 25 Jul 2019 01:46:14 -0400 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 85DEF21880; Thu, 25 Jul 2019 05:46:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1564033573; bh=mCR6aN+uceSECLUj63ofoTuojhqSJs4eio7FLW/vthU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=hjOPIiu09eoVIvEWB7Nss+AKOb7EsyCwV+a2hrubsTIhREx/pWCeXGEKT+hKkimR4 iV+7S9AnZYwSGIPJxsZFke8giBCtapty3zlAz/Uv/jlFQNrNg6S1eJRF3v0Agf+7vx tHjf/AyfO9Ftk+8mUBzJM5XYPvoTTESdxDfhHITE= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Horia Geanta , Iuliana Prodan , Sascha Hauer , Ard Biesheuvel , Herbert Xu Subject: [PATCH 4.19 252/271] crypto: caam - limit output IV to CBC to work around CTR mode DMA issue Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2019 21:22:01 +0200 Message-Id: <20190724191716.805830869@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0 In-Reply-To: <20190724191655.268628197@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190724191655.268628197@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Ard Biesheuvel commit ed527b13d800dd515a9e6c582f0a73eca65b2e1b upstream. The CAAM driver currently violates an undocumented and slightly controversial requirement imposed by the crypto stack that a buffer referred to by the request structure via its virtual address may not be modified while any scatterlists passed via the same request structure are mapped for inbound DMA. This may result in errors like alg: aead: decryption failed on test 1 for gcm_base(ctr-aes-caam,ghash-generic): ret=74 alg: aead: Failed to load transform for gcm(aes): -2 on non-cache coherent systems, due to the fact that the GCM driver passes an IV buffer by virtual address which shares a cacheline with the auth_tag buffer passed via a scatterlist, resulting in corruption of the auth_tag when the IV is updated while the DMA mapping is live. Since the IV that is returned to the caller is only valid for CBC mode, and given that the in-kernel users of CBC (such as CTS) don't trigger the same issue as the GCM driver, let's just disable the output IV generation for all modes except CBC for the time being. Fixes: 854b06f76879 ("crypto: caam - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt") Cc: Horia Geanta Cc: Iuliana Prodan Reported-by: Sascha Hauer Cc: Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Reviewed-by: Horia Geanta Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu [ Horia: backported to 4.14, 4.19 ] Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c @@ -887,6 +887,7 @@ static void ablkcipher_encrypt_done(stru struct ablkcipher_request *req = context; struct ablkcipher_edesc *edesc; struct crypto_ablkcipher *ablkcipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(req); + struct caam_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(ablkcipher); int ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(ablkcipher); #ifdef DEBUG @@ -911,10 +912,11 @@ static void ablkcipher_encrypt_done(stru /* * The crypto API expects us to set the IV (req->info) to the last - * ciphertext block. This is used e.g. by the CTS mode. + * ciphertext block when running in CBC mode. */ - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->dst, req->nbytes - ivsize, - ivsize, 0); + if ((ctx->cdata.algtype & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == OP_ALG_AAI_CBC) + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->dst, req->nbytes - + ivsize, ivsize, 0); /* In case initial IV was generated, copy it in GIVCIPHER request */ if (edesc->iv_dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE) { @@ -1651,10 +1653,11 @@ static int ablkcipher_decrypt(struct abl /* * The crypto API expects us to set the IV (req->info) to the last - * ciphertext block. + * ciphertext block when running in CBC mode. */ - scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->src, req->nbytes - ivsize, - ivsize, 0); + if ((ctx->cdata.algtype & OP_ALG_AAI_MASK) == OP_ALG_AAI_CBC) + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->info, req->src, req->nbytes - + ivsize, ivsize, 0); /* Create and submit job descriptor*/ init_ablkcipher_job(ctx->sh_desc_dec, ctx->sh_desc_dec_dma, edesc, req);