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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id r17si19885935pgg.155.2019.07.26.12.36.01; Fri, 26 Jul 2019 12:36:16 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729038AbfGZSBE (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 26 Jul 2019 14:01:04 -0400 Received: from mga07.intel.com ([134.134.136.100]:39633 "EHLO mga07.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727951AbfGZSBE (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Jul 2019 14:01:04 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga003.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.29]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jul 2019 11:01:03 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,311,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="178472981" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.41]) by FMSMGA003.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 26 Jul 2019 11:01:03 -0700 Date: Fri, 26 Jul 2019 11:01:03 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook , Andy Lutomirski , Vincenzo Frascino , X86 ML , LKML , Paul Bolle Subject: Re: [5.2 REGRESSION] Generic vDSO breaks seccomp-enabled userspace on i386 Message-ID: <20190726180103.GE3188@linux.intel.com> References: <201907221012.41504DCD@keescook> <201907221135.2C2D262D8@keescook> <201907221620.F31B9A082@keescook> <201907231437.DB20BEBD3@keescook> <201907231636.AD3ED717D@keescook> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org +cc Paul On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 01:56:34AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > On Tue, 23 Jul 2019, Kees Cook wrote: > > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 12:59:03AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote: > > > And as we have sys_clock_gettime64() exposed for 32bit anyway you need to > > > deal with that in seccomp independently of the VDSO. It does not make sense > > > to treat sys_clock_gettime() differently than sys_clock_gettime64(). They > > > both expose the same information, but the latter is y2038 safe. > > > > Okay, so combining Andy's ideas on aliasing and "more seccomp flags", > > we could declare that clock_gettime64() is not filterable on 32-bit at > > all without the magic SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES flag or something. Then we > > would alias clock_gettime64 to clock_gettime _before_ the first evaluation > > (unless SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES is set)? > > > > (When was clock_gettime64() introduced? Is it too long ago to do this > > "you can't filter it without a special flag" change?) > > clock_gettime64() and the other sys_*time64() syscalls which address the > y2038 issue were added in 5.1 Paul Bolle pointed out that this regression showed up in v5.3-rc1, not v5.2. In Paul's case, systemd-journal is failing.