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Date:   Sat, 27 Jul 2019 20:43:04 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
cc:     Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
        X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Subject: Re: [5.2 REGRESSION] Generic vDSO breaks seccomp-enabled userspace
 on i386
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On Sat, 27 Jul 2019, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 11:01 AM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > +cc Paul
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 01:56:34AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > On Tue, 23 Jul 2019, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 12:59:03AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > > > And as we have sys_clock_gettime64() exposed for 32bit anyway you need to
> > > > > deal with that in seccomp independently of the VDSO. It does not make sense
> > > > > to treat sys_clock_gettime() differently than sys_clock_gettime64(). They
> > > > > both expose the same information, but the latter is y2038 safe.
> > > >
> > > > Okay, so combining Andy's ideas on aliasing and "more seccomp flags",
> > > > we could declare that clock_gettime64() is not filterable on 32-bit at
> > > > all without the magic SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES flag or something. Then we
> > > > would alias clock_gettime64 to clock_gettime _before_ the first evaluation
> > > > (unless SECCOMP_IGNORE_ALIASES is set)?
> > > >
> > > > (When was clock_gettime64() introduced? Is it too long ago to do this
> > > > "you can't filter it without a special flag" change?)
> > >
> > > clock_gettime64() and the other sys_*time64() syscalls which address the
> > > y2038 issue were added in 5.1
> >
> > Paul Bolle pointed out that this regression showed up in v5.3-rc1, not
> > v5.2.  In Paul's case, systemd-journal is failing.
> 
> I think it's getting quite late to start inventing new seccomp
> features to fix this.  I think the right solution for 5.3 is to change
> the 32-bit vdso fallback to use the old clock_gettime, i.e.
> clock_gettime32.  This is obviously not an acceptable long-term
> solution.

Sigh. I'll have a look....

Thanks,

	tglx