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From:   Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Date:   Mon, 29 Jul 2019 14:47:03 -0700
Message-ID: <CACdnJuvFBQCpR4hk1YBQ2HSxJcweB0_XBqYZxn=LpG6NFU7S6w@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V36 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in
 confidentiality mode
To:     James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc:     LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
        Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
        Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
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On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 12:45 PM Matthew Garrett
<matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
>
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

Any further feedback on this?