Received: by 2002:a25:8b12:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i18csp3246890ybl; Mon, 19 Aug 2019 15:03:29 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy3wmWUJ7vPx26f0jywnJVUoyHbmY7+cVaFsscCEI2D1z22NR9mLclh8QU2foDENmtrPFl+ X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:7b85:: with SMTP id w5mr8329154pll.302.1566252209676; Mon, 19 Aug 2019 15:03:29 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1566252209; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=WD1fjGVTuIb9dAJjKHOBxXyIbzb6s3kzNiKKtCSJdiIvYhIdTUT9uHHf13nUDTFYzL fKnU1EnUu+DwVYPEW4XH6FQOKGzo+tHqz7t3mKBYtrpqRK73KxCulhju1ub6TpRc88Cz OORUpWEVTBHN9H2Sxu2myCYu2ebqaDn6cdYeBtVTquu8mRJeItirewSL+OI608HvbuzK rZHmqq2xJNTz6yzBidthtJFJvEwdPcaWCKwhectxvGkMx+1B2waVAx0TeHKLs5cvuWWs z53lDEPVAdi4oBOG2Kb9+4CACMSKQM/GxBlSboLrCGGpkPWKZyWdvna6gk0lOI6vodbr PnYg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=MIkZmW70tsQDCvjyD5B+CSJRAOrjGDiLtTp2CN/n0XQ=; b=AnXU3u70XdF1ifwo1dTaXdPWAvo9ph7TIz4bfOAoBZWMq8S2VLbcPYUubh3dhzfaip vSjOXCsRS/HfaAFwY9c9egJQqUFHgQNhCDr8BFZSpxu9EEoWnHHxedD4ig75BIqUmAyC XUxjOnuN71g4q7pJXok7s2yyUPsnP7nCu4vMS5DbyG12Wix2F+JSEYSFbMlX5ENYP65d U240dtwMjrK1aT7/vlpcpC6HslcLA6GNImRU8po/mkK6nbv1GsgDjUDmuLbC8mh4ZyU8 yboRzpIJYo82SW2hCnVjPiVuLY9CcbqWjXRbkUAn+hYZkvK7Bpu4N8YHeTvorwTEjF6V Q7RA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id i12si10802159pgs.126.2019.08.19.15.03.14; Mon, 19 Aug 2019 15:03:29 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728578AbfHSWBw (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 19 Aug 2019 18:01:52 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:45058 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728136AbfHSWBv (ORCPT ); Mon, 19 Aug 2019 18:01:51 -0400 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 19 Aug 2019 15:01:50 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,406,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="207147864" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.41]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 19 Aug 2019 15:01:50 -0700 Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2019 15:01:50 -0700 From: Sean Christopherson To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Paolo Bonzini , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , X86 ML , Jarkko Sakkinen , Joerg Roedel , "H. Peter Anvin" , kvm list , LKML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 08/21] KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops hook to short circuit emulation Message-ID: <20190819220150.GE1916@linux.intel.com> References: <20190727055214.9282-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20190727055214.9282-9-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> <20190730024940.GL21120@linux.intel.com> <25BBDA64-1253-4429-95AF-5D578684F6CC@amacapital.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <25BBDA64-1253-4429-95AF-5D578684F6CC@amacapital.net> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 05:47:12PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > >> On Jul 29, 2019, at 7:49 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: > >> > >> On Sat, Jul 27, 2019 at 10:38:03AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > >> On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 10:52 PM Sean Christopherson > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Similar to the existing AMD #NPF case where emulation of the current > >>> instruction is not possible due to lack of information, virtualization > >>> of Intel SGX will introduce a scenario where emulation is not possible > >>> due to the VMExit occurring in an SGX enclave. And again similar to > >>> the AMD case, emulation can be initiated by kvm_mmu_page_fault(), i.e. > >>> outside of the control of the vendor-specific code. > >>> > >>> While the cause and architecturally visible behavior of the two cases > >>> is different, e.g. Intel SGX will inject a #UD whereas AMD #NPF is a > >>> clean resume or complete shutdown, the impact on the common emulation > >>> code is identical: KVM must stop emulation immediately and resume the > >>> guest. > >>> > >>> Replace the exisiting need_emulation_on_page_fault() with a more generic > >>> is_emulatable() kvm_x86_ops callback, which is called unconditionally > >>> by x86_emulate_instruction(). > >> > >> Having recently noticed that emulate_ud() is broken when the guest's > >> TF is set, I suppose I should ask: does your new code function > >> sensibly when TF is set? > > > > Barring a VMX fault injection interaction I'm not thinking of, yes. The > > SGX reaction to the #UD VM-Exit is to inject a #UD and resume the guest, > > pending breakpoints shouldn't be affected in any way (unless some other > > part of KVM mucks with them, e.g. when guest single-stepping is enabled). > > What I mean is: does the code actually do what you think it does if TF is > set? Right now, as I understand it, the KVM emulation code has a bug in > which some emulated faults also inject #DB despite the fact that the > instruction faulted, and the #DB seems to take precedence over the original > fault. This confuses the guest. Yes. The proposed change is to inject the #UD instead of calling into the emulator, and by inspection I've verified that all code that injects a #DB is either contained within the emulator or is mutually exclusive with an intercepted #UD. It's a qualified yes because I don't have an actual testcase to verify my literacy. I'll look into adding a test, either to the selftest/x86/sgx or to kvm-unit-tests.