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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id p8si1191513pff.37.2019.08.22.18.55.52; Thu, 22 Aug 2019 18:56:07 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=F7GFDt2r; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2404206AbfHVRY3 (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 22 Aug 2019 13:24:29 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:45022 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2404047AbfHVRYE (ORCPT ); Thu, 22 Aug 2019 13:24:04 -0400 Received: from localhost (wsip-184-188-36-2.sd.sd.cox.net [184.188.36.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CFF6E21743; Thu, 22 Aug 2019 17:24:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1566494644; bh=U+5/RrXOQutRbuZmw4dlReGIyr1KMoPslZAYy4gZk4k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=F7GFDt2rIcO6pqTF5dw+wHrnrSSS+4wjxMK6M8w7ZbjmjbHSF6m1O2VwuZ8Fo/oI2 lrAzRLKv3tIyRXsrMEZC1/grOC0gr57Z9PUuQ0hv1D6Z5kp1ITw8jYZkqA8kqzB/zJ RkE67lrOX5P+RtdT5mp7Y4DLPwaRDJuWD4p3EFF8= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Tony Luck , Doug Ledford , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.9 078/103] IB/core: Add mitigation for Spectre V1 Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 10:19:06 -0700 Message-Id: <20190822171732.133003933@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.23.0 In-Reply-To: <20190822171728.445189830@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190822171728.445189830@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org [ Upstream commit 61f259821dd3306e49b7d42a3f90fb5a4ff3351b ] Some processors may mispredict an array bounds check and speculatively access memory that they should not. With a user supplied array index we like to play things safe by masking the value with the array size before it is used as an index. Signed-off-by: Tony Luck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190731043957.GA1600@agluck-desk2.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c index 415a3185cde7f..cf93a96b63249 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include @@ -843,11 +844,14 @@ static int ib_umad_unreg_agent(struct ib_umad_file *file, u32 __user *arg) if (get_user(id, arg)) return -EFAULT; + if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS) + return -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&file->port->file_mutex); mutex_lock(&file->mutex); - if (id >= IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS || !__get_agent(file, id)) { + id = array_index_nospec(id, IB_UMAD_MAX_AGENTS); + if (!__get_agent(file, id)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- 2.20.1