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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 145si11614667pfb.262.2019.08.26.18.10.36; Mon, 26 Aug 2019 18:10:51 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728527AbfH0BJT (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 26 Aug 2019 21:09:19 -0400 Received: from mga01.intel.com ([192.55.52.88]:5441 "EHLO mga01.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726257AbfH0BJT (ORCPT ); Mon, 26 Aug 2019 21:09:19 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga006.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.51]) by fmsmga101.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Aug 2019 18:09:19 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,435,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="185131879" Received: from dwillia2-desk3.jf.intel.com (HELO dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com) ([10.54.39.16]) by orsmga006-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Aug 2019 18:09:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v2 2/3] libnvdimm/security: Tighten scope of nvdimm->busy vs security operations From: Dan Williams To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Cc: Dave Jiang , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2019 17:55:00 -0700 Message-ID: <156686729996.184120.3458026302402493937.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <156686728950.184120.5188743631586996901.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> References: <156686728950.184120.5188743631586996901.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/0.18-2-gc94f MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org An attempt to freeze DIMMs currently runs afoul of default blocking of all security operations in the entry to the 'store' routine for the 'security' sysfs attribute. The blanket blocking of all security operations while the DIMM is in active use in a region is too restrictive. The only security operations that need to be aware of the ->busy state are those that mutate the state of data, i.e. erase and overwrite. Refactor the ->busy checks to be applied at the entry common entry point in __security_store() rather than each of the helper routines to enable freeze to be run regardless of busy state. Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++----------------- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c index 53330625fe07..d837cb9be83d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c @@ -424,9 +424,6 @@ static ssize_t __security_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t len) unsigned int key, newkey; int i; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) - return -EBUSY; - rc = sscanf(buf, "%"__stringify(SEC_CMD_SIZE)"s" " %"__stringify(KEY_ID_SIZE)"s" " %"__stringify(KEY_ID_SIZE)"s", @@ -451,23 +448,25 @@ static ssize_t __security_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t len) } else if (i == OP_DISABLE) { dev_dbg(dev, "disable %u\n", key); rc = nvdimm_security_disable(nvdimm, key); - } else if (i == OP_UPDATE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "update %u %u\n", key, newkey); - rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, NVDIMM_USER); - } else if (i == OP_ERASE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "erase %u\n", key); - rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, NVDIMM_USER); + } else if (i == OP_UPDATE || i == OP_MASTER_UPDATE) { + dev_dbg(dev, "%s %u %u\n", ops[i].name, key, newkey); + rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, i == OP_UPDATE + ? NVDIMM_USER : NVDIMM_MASTER); + } else if (i == OP_ERASE || i == OP_MASTER_ERASE) { + dev_dbg(dev, "%s %u\n", ops[i].name, key); + if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } + rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, i == OP_ERASE + ? NVDIMM_USER : NVDIMM_MASTER); } else if (i == OP_OVERWRITE) { dev_dbg(dev, "overwrite %u\n", key); + if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { + dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } rc = nvdimm_security_overwrite(nvdimm, key); - } else if (i == OP_MASTER_UPDATE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "master_update %u %u\n", key, newkey); - rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey, - NVDIMM_MASTER); - } else if (i == OP_MASTER_ERASE) { - dev_dbg(dev, "master_erase %u\n", key); - rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key, - NVDIMM_MASTER); } else return -EINVAL; diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index 5862d0eee9db..2166e627383a 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -334,11 +334,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid, || !nvdimm->sec.flags) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); - return -EBUSY; - } - rc = check_security_state(nvdimm); if (rc) return rc; @@ -380,11 +375,6 @@ int nvdimm_security_overwrite(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) || !nvdimm->sec.flags) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { - dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); - return -EBUSY; - } - if (dev->driver == NULL) { dev_dbg(dev, "Unable to overwrite while DIMM active.\n"); return -EINVAL;