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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id h24si1561469pfq.84.2019.08.27.21.59.26; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 21:59:41 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726199AbfH1E5T (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 28 Aug 2019 00:57:19 -0400 Received: from baldur.buserror.net ([165.227.176.147]:49204 "EHLO baldur.buserror.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726024AbfH1E5S (ORCPT ); Wed, 28 Aug 2019 00:57:18 -0400 Received: from [2601:449:8400:7293:12bf:48ff:fe84:c9a0] (helo=home.buserror.net) by baldur.buserror.net with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.89) (envelope-from ) id 1i2pyy-0007QK-Tp; Tue, 27 Aug 2019 23:54:58 -0500 Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 23:54:54 -0500 From: Scott Wood To: Jason Yan Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, christophe.leroy@c-s.fr, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, npiggin@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jingxiangfeng@huawei.com, zhaohongjiang@huawei.com, thunder.leizhen@huawei.com, fanchengyang@huawei.com, yebin10@huawei.com Message-ID: <20190828045454.GB17757@home.buserror.net> References: <20190809100800.5426-1-yanaijie@huawei.com> <20190809100800.5426-7-yanaijie@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190809100800.5426-7-yanaijie@huawei.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2601:449:8400:7293:12bf:48ff:fe84:c9a0 X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: yanaijie@huawei.com, mpe@ellerman.id.au, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, diana.craciun@nxp.com, christophe.leroy@c-s.fr, benh@kernel.crashing.org, paulus@samba.org, npiggin@gmail.com, keescook@chromium.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jingxiangfeng@huawei.com, zhaohongjiang@huawei.com, thunder.leizhen@huawei.com, fanchengyang@huawei.com, yebin10@huawei.com X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: oss@buserror.net X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on baldur.localdomain X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.5 required=5.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,BAYES_00, GREYLIST_ISWHITE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * -15 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -1.5 GREYLIST_ISWHITE The incoming server has been whitelisted for * this recipient and sender Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 06/12] powerpc/fsl_booke/32: implement KASLR infrastructure X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Tue, 02 Aug 2016 21:08:31 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on baldur.buserror.net) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 06:07:54PM +0800, Jason Yan wrote: > This patch add support to boot kernel from places other than KERNELBASE. > Since CONFIG_RELOCATABLE has already supported, what we need to do is > map or copy kernel to a proper place and relocate. Freescale Book-E > parts expect lowmem to be mapped by fixed TLB entries(TLB1). The TLB1 > entries are not suitable to map the kernel directly in a randomized > region, so we chose to copy the kernel to a proper place and restart to > relocate. > > The offset of the kernel was not randomized yet(a fixed 64M is set). We > will randomize it in the next patch. > > Signed-off-by: Jason Yan > Cc: Diana Craciun > Cc: Michael Ellerman > Cc: Christophe Leroy > Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt > Cc: Paul Mackerras > Cc: Nicholas Piggin > Cc: Kees Cook > Tested-by: Diana Craciun > Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy > --- > arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 11 ++++ > arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 1 + > arch/powerpc/kernel/early_32.c | 2 +- > arch/powerpc/kernel/fsl_booke_entry_mapping.S | 17 +++-- > arch/powerpc/kernel/head_fsl_booke.S | 13 +++- > arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++ > arch/powerpc/mm/mmu_decl.h | 7 +++ > arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c | 7 ++- > 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > index 77f6ebf97113..710c12ef7159 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig > @@ -548,6 +548,17 @@ config RELOCATABLE > setting can still be useful to bootwrappers that need to know the > load address of the kernel (eg. u-boot/mkimage). > > +config RANDOMIZE_BASE > + bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image" > + depends on (FSL_BOOKE && FLATMEM && PPC32) > + depends on RELOCATABLE > + help > + Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is > + loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts > + relying on knowledge of the location of kernel internals. > + > + If unsure, say N. > + Why is N the safe default (other than concerns about code maturity, though arm64 and mips don't seem to have updated this recommendation after several years)? On x86 this defaults to Y. > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fsl_booke_entry_mapping.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fsl_booke_entry_mapping.S > index f4d3eaae54a9..641920d4f694 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/fsl_booke_entry_mapping.S > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/fsl_booke_entry_mapping.S > @@ -155,23 +155,22 @@ skpinv: addi r6,r6,1 /* Increment */ > > #if defined(ENTRY_MAPPING_BOOT_SETUP) > > -/* 6. Setup KERNELBASE mapping in TLB1[0] */ > +/* 6. Setup kernstart_virt_addr mapping in TLB1[0] */ > lis r6,0x1000 /* Set MAS0(TLBSEL) = TLB1(1), ESEL = 0 */ > mtspr SPRN_MAS0,r6 > lis r6,(MAS1_VALID|MAS1_IPROT)@h > ori r6,r6,(MAS1_TSIZE(BOOK3E_PAGESZ_64M))@l > mtspr SPRN_MAS1,r6 > - lis r6,MAS2_VAL(PAGE_OFFSET, BOOK3E_PAGESZ_64M, MAS2_M_IF_NEEDED)@h > - ori r6,r6,MAS2_VAL(PAGE_OFFSET, BOOK3E_PAGESZ_64M, MAS2_M_IF_NEEDED)@l > - mtspr SPRN_MAS2,r6 > + lis r6,MAS2_EPN_MASK(BOOK3E_PAGESZ_64M)@h > + ori r6,r6,MAS2_EPN_MASK(BOOK3E_PAGESZ_64M)@l > + and r6,r6,r20 > + ori r6,r6,MAS2_M_IF_NEEDED@l > + mtspr SPRN_MAS2,r6 Please use tabs rather than spaces between the mnemonic and the arguments. It looks like that was the last user of MAS2_VAL so let's remove it. > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000000..f8dc60534ac1 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/kaslr_booke.c Shouldn't this go under arch/powerpc/mm/nohash? > +/* > + * To see if we need to relocate the kernel to a random offset > + * void *dt_ptr - address of the device tree > + * phys_addr_t size - size of the first memory block > + */ > +notrace void __init kaslr_early_init(void *dt_ptr, phys_addr_t size) > +{ > + unsigned long tlb_virt; > + phys_addr_t tlb_phys; > + unsigned long offset; > + unsigned long kernel_sz; > + > + kernel_sz = (unsigned long)_end - KERNELBASE; Why KERNELBASE and not kernstart_addr? > + > + offset = kaslr_choose_location(dt_ptr, size, kernel_sz); > + > + if (offset == 0) > + return; > + > + kernstart_virt_addr += offset; > + kernstart_addr += offset; > + > + is_second_reloc = 1; > + > + if (offset >= SZ_64M) { > + tlb_virt = round_down(kernstart_virt_addr, SZ_64M); > + tlb_phys = round_down(kernstart_addr, SZ_64M); If kernstart_addr wasn't 64M-aligned before adding offset, then "offset >= SZ_64M" is not necessarily going to detect when you've crossed a mapping boundary. > + > + /* Create kernel map to relocate in */ > + create_tlb_entry(tlb_phys, tlb_virt, 1); > + } > + > + /* Copy the kernel to it's new location and run */ > + memcpy((void *)kernstart_virt_addr, (void *)KERNELBASE, kernel_sz); > + > + reloc_kernel_entry(dt_ptr, kernstart_virt_addr); > +} After copying, call flush_icache_range() on the destination. > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c > index 556e3cd52a35..2dc27cf88add 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/nohash/fsl_booke.c > @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ void setup_initial_memory_limit(phys_addr_t first_memblock_base, > int __initdata is_second_reloc; > notrace void __init relocate_init(u64 dt_ptr, phys_addr_t start) > { > - unsigned long base = KERNELBASE; > + unsigned long base = kernstart_virt_addr; > + phys_addr_t size; > > kernstart_addr = start; > if (is_second_reloc) { > @@ -291,7 +292,7 @@ notrace void __init relocate_init(u64 dt_ptr, phys_addr_t start) > start &= ~0x3ffffff; > base &= ~0x3ffffff; > virt_phys_offset = base - start; > - early_get_first_memblock_info(__va(dt_ptr), NULL); > + early_get_first_memblock_info(__va(dt_ptr), &size); > /* > * We now get the memstart_addr, then we should check if this > * address is the same as what the PAGE_OFFSET map to now. If > @@ -316,6 +317,8 @@ notrace void __init relocate_init(u64 dt_ptr, phys_addr_t start) > /* We should never reach here */ > panic("Relocation error"); > } > + > + kaslr_early_init(__va(dt_ptr), size); Are you assuming that available memory starts at physical address zero? This isn't true of some partitioning scenarios, or in a kdump crash kernel. -Scott