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Date:   Thu, 29 Aug 2019 09:43:43 -0700
From:   Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
To:     Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
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        syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: general protection fault in tls_sk_proto_close (2)
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On Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:00 +0800, Hillf Danton wrote:
> Alternatively work is done if sock is closed again. Anyway ctx is reset
> under sock's callback lock in write mode.
> 
> --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> @@ -295,6 +295,8 @@ static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct so
>  	long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, 0);
>  	bool free_ctx;
>  
> +	if (!ctx)
> +		return;
>  	if (ctx->tx_conf == TLS_SW)
>  		tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(ctx);

That's no bueno, the real socket's close will never get called.