Received: by 2002:a25:8b12:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id i18csp2852966ybl; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 14:00:07 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxYHBcGl6IKRkjTg9kKctqf01DqEzkec9mcVsZ+N7/0G0NcNmaakhiMHQ5grVaNHN7ztGS0 X-Received: by 2002:a65:448a:: with SMTP id l10mr9868367pgq.327.1567112407372; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 14:00:07 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1567112407; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=Gb5DNVSnXwMuKR/i23vbgm6YSWBPoz24W+rOQkwwFYhJkKujKo8FLmYz7nfewrZok4 VTPvVXlsSTFQ2WfxQAtn1XDKF8++e25/OU+umPJGWzr1eDEHHUqc5j7v6viObbJpCeFq njyY7QcecKumyJyVIdg8eXW23Fk4NGT8vG3Gng70UNF20/CYdk3XiOh5WKGzcXeVamGP 8ToxI4CmlwszwEC4GMEqBVO1AnqlhTqEjHBafugqpI/yw+OZPnvVccN0+zzMAevzGaQc NAjUlhkClpD2NNW6V5yyI5vtaBExPTeA+IYuADiL5hcC7eElvNmzZYE6DaEAZjQdexJa 4w2g== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=+RzjwqquKSge4D+puNeFP845JxkkHjT8vD1ZrIV0+lM=; b=Xs8Dxfvgzt0KfkFXr11NBGyVrNZwIGq/x02ZW1FraOjePAKaySEDPMfP+eJBEIyfsS aFRDeOIvpLA1sRQlQeEiuDW5Fv2a0bFN3iG/ag5hnO5aODZkQHXgZXcEJXtq7YU8EQ89 gXExnQZOSks0Je9qpld6kG1+wTn4z63U5IloW7lM7TlaBZ5jrVgXbqeAP4OnutQv4GAL 3IpHVGLNP9Nc7kBXTM0+4sTlL+GPgbn/h+3oCKD8CA7DuK10SVMPLJLu2CxziQRCoOvx nngjnVoRKFlfriqeaIyFUTmuzEFrvXzMlrsZ2XgElNalcQlTsGzXd/ENBY/36PJ/ssSp M02A== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id m190si2887552pga.322.2019.08.29.13.59.52; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 14:00:07 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728300AbfH2U6h (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 29 Aug 2019 16:58:37 -0400 Received: from Chamillionaire.breakpoint.cc ([193.142.43.52]:53624 "EHLO Chamillionaire.breakpoint.cc" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726935AbfH2U6h (ORCPT ); Thu, 29 Aug 2019 16:58:37 -0400 Received: from fw by Chamillionaire.breakpoint.cc with local (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1i3RV2-0007J3-97; Thu, 29 Aug 2019 22:58:32 +0200 Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 22:58:32 +0200 From: Florian Westphal To: Leonardo Bras Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso , Florian Westphal , "David S. Miller" , netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, coreteam@netfilter.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jozsef Kadlecsik , Alexey Kuznetsov , Hideaki YOSHIFUJI Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] netfilter: nf_tables: fib: Drop IPV6 packages if IPv6 is disabled on boot Message-ID: <20190829205832.GM20113@breakpoint.cc> References: <20190821141505.2394-1-leonardo@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Leonardo Bras wrote: > On Thu, 2019-08-29 at 17:04 -0300, Leonardo Bras wrote: > > > Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the > > > "net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on? > > > > Running > > # sudo sysctl -a > > I can see: > > net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 1 > > Also, doing > # echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/bridge/bridge-nf-call-ip6tables > And then trying to boot the guest will not crash the host. > > Which would make sense, since host iptables is not dealing with guest > IPv6 packets. Yes. > So, the real cause of this bug is the bridge making host ip6tables deal > with guest IPv6 packets ? > If so, would it be ok if write a patch testing ipv6_mod_enabled() > before passing guest ipv6 packets to host ip6tables? I'm not sure. This switch is very old, it was added 10 years ago in v2.6.31-rc1. Even if we disable call-ip6tables in br_netfilter we will at least in addition need a patch for nft_fib_netdev.c. From a "avoid calls to ipv6 stack when its disabled" standpoint, the safest fix is to disable call-ip6tables functionality if ipv6 module is off *and* fix nft_fib_netdev.c to BREAK in ipv6 is off case. I started to place a list of suspicous modules here, but that got out of hand quickly. So, given I don't want to plaster ipv6_mod_enabled() everywhere, I would suggest this course of action: 1. add a patch to BREAK in nft_fib_netdev.c for !ipv6_mod_enabled() 2. change net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c, br_nf_pre_routing() to make sure ipv6_mod_enabled() is true before doing the ipv6 stack "emulation". Makes sense? Thanks, Florian