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Date:   Mon, 9 Sep 2019 09:06:54 +0100
From:   Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
To:     Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 1/2] f2fs: do not select same victim right
 again
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On 09/09, Chao Yu wrote:
> On 2019/9/9 9:25, Jaegeuk Kim wrote:
> > GC must avoid select the same victim again.
> 
> Blocks in previous victim will occupy addition free segment, I doubt after this
> change, FGGC may encounter out-of-free space issue more frequently.

Hmm, actually this change seems wrong by sec_usage_check().
We may be able to avoid this only in the suspicious loop?

---
 fs/f2fs/gc.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/f2fs/gc.c b/fs/f2fs/gc.c
index e88f98ddf396..5877bd729689 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ int f2fs_gc(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool sync,
 		round++;
 	}
 
-	if (gc_type == FG_GC)
+	if (gc_type == FG_GC && seg_freed)
 		sbi->cur_victim_sec = NULL_SEGNO;
 
 	if (sync)
-- 
2.19.0.605.g01d371f741-goog