Received: by 2002:a25:c593:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id v141csp342106ybe; Wed, 18 Sep 2019 18:31:20 -0700 (PDT) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqywiiXUp1uQR4o5LYqXKZIRmXj591n6ro319tAkrWEEJTD4oLSedZeXzqYicDtH8hDALbGR X-Received: by 2002:aa7:dcc3:: with SMTP id w3mr13597795edu.202.1568856680387; Wed, 18 Sep 2019 18:31:20 -0700 (PDT) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1568856680; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=GlF5xna8fICRTJ9rJUMlCoQRQSHA9d+yip323Jlm6OevnTqXs7hFw0muN2UzLMjh4L VRIeI1O3C229kZfryiReZZs5HBy97Q5g0Owdmt2rQSXzi8d3h8hN5wUuE0jbv/5XSCuY T61ADjn3HhBfYzI6WOvG8ELPz3TqwceQnuhSQsQY8J6vI0d3oEYoCA7Fk6ubdP3ZkAz4 VDwDWs4fCtmpMTfayk7CZS1RykxOSiyvFlF0tNA0W+4cHiMSYYKk1se94AAmRMeEiYh6 tdqk2x3yTR0zIGazvC6nH7A8sLVjOchvGXKKZSv9MfMWIZG2ZC77b1FpyfRwnq+GB10s Z4Kg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:references:in-reply-to:references :in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to:from; bh=lnbmnnHnXuWqeX+dd7VUHE//qTCluML/prQ93drLioc=; b=J6tnYHtMUJ03fMmGKzKOHys/r8gaksxq9CRRVIMYOtJfgZ964HlOnVEhpqe/iDFxl2 zbeLgcdEPlheWJyDfQ4/GO1acM7jXtvofCmDMXTOQdiBmKpsyLnS7kvnw+DyZC8pjrtY Ei9ZY7EEPHkpuOgBoZeoNGkxjGg1DFZFwC+E0rDMNLOl4tEmw7yefGG/MNIRHfocfarl m53ihedy8ncRDHg5hcZsj+LHe6EgbXBCMdzobewys1xRtJ4itqIzAL54Q7eBxW6yMyrh 57Ws900jHS9ljx3RZ6nOl0vX9cLT69+gCI2Bf736qoLk4gJfoYrmPZZ1y84GOz1wLXhC HyUg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id b9si3810650eju.269.2019.09.18.18.30.57; Wed, 18 Sep 2019 18:31:20 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=redhat.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2387760AbfISB0T (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 18 Sep 2019 21:26:19 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:24952 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726257AbfISB0T (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Sep 2019 21:26:19 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx02.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7C67D307CDEA; Thu, 19 Sep 2019 01:26:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from madcap2.tricolour.ca (ovpn-112-19.phx2.redhat.com [10.3.112.19]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id DE43160C5D; Thu, 19 Sep 2019 01:25:58 +0000 (UTC) From: Richard Guy Briggs To: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paul Moore , sgrubb@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com, dwalsh@redhat.com, mpatel@redhat.com, Richard Guy Briggs Subject: [PATCH ghak90 V7 12/21] audit: add support for containerid to network namespaces Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 21:22:29 -0400 Message-Id: <91315ac64b44bcad9dfc623fa7fefe67d7d2561b.1568834524.git.rgb@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.12 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.49]); Thu, 19 Sep 2019 01:26:18 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Audit events could happen in a network namespace outside of a task context due to packets received from the net that trigger an auditing rule prior to being associated with a running task. The network namespace could be in use by multiple containers by association to the tasks in that network namespace. We still want a way to attribute these events to any potential containers. Keep a list per network namespace to track these audit container identifiiers. Add/increment the audit container identifier on: - initial setting of the audit container identifier via /proc - clone/fork call that inherits an audit container identifier - unshare call that inherits an audit container identifier - setns call that inherits an audit container identifier Delete/decrement the audit container identifier on: - an inherited audit container identifier dropped when child set - process exit - unshare call that drops a net namespace - setns call that drops a net namespace Please see the github audit kernel issue for contid net support: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/92 Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs Acked-by: Neil Horman Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- include/linux/audit.h | 19 +++++++++++ kernel/audit.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/nsproxy.c | 4 +++ 3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 575fff6ea7c9..73e3ab38e3e0 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include #include /* LOOKUP_* */ #include +#include #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) @@ -122,6 +123,13 @@ struct audit_task_info { extern struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit; +struct audit_contid { + struct list_head list; + u64 id; + refcount_t refcount; + struct rcu_head rcu; +}; + extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which); extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list); @@ -229,6 +237,10 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) extern void audit_cont_put(struct audit_cont *cont); extern void audit_log_container_id(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid); +extern void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid); +extern void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid); +extern void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, + struct task_struct *p); extern u32 audit_enabled; @@ -309,6 +321,13 @@ static inline void audit_cont_put(struct audit_cont *cont) static inline void audit_log_container_id(struct audit_context *context, u64 contid) { } +static inline void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) +{ } +static inline void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, + struct task_struct *p) +{ } #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 7cdb76b38966..e0c27bc39925 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "audit.h" @@ -86,9 +87,13 @@ /** * struct audit_net - audit private network namespace data * @sk: communication socket + * @contid_list: audit container identifier list + * @contid_list_lock audit container identifier list lock */ struct audit_net { struct sock *sk; + struct list_head contid_list; + spinlock_t contid_list_lock; }; /** @@ -269,8 +274,11 @@ struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit; + struct nsproxy *ns = tsk->nsproxy; audit_free_syscall(tsk); + if (ns) + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, audit_get_contid(tsk)); /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. */ @@ -373,6 +381,75 @@ static struct sock *audit_get_sk(const struct net *net) return aunet->sk; } +void audit_netns_contid_add(struct net *net, u64 contid) +{ + struct audit_net *aunet; + struct list_head *contid_list; + struct audit_contid *cont; + + if (!net) + return; + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) + return; + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); + if (!aunet) + return; + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) + if (cont->id == contid) { + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); + goto out; + } + cont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_contid), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (cont) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cont->list); + cont->id = contid; + refcount_set(&cont->refcount, 1); + list_add_rcu(&cont->list, contid_list); + } +out: + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); +} + +void audit_netns_contid_del(struct net *net, u64 contid) +{ + struct audit_net *aunet; + struct list_head *contid_list; + struct audit_contid *cont = NULL; + + if (!net) + return; + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) + return; + aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); + if (!aunet) + return; + contid_list = &aunet->contid_list; + spin_lock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, contid_list, list) + if (cont->id == contid) { + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); + } + break; + } + spin_unlock(&aunet->contid_list_lock); +} + +void audit_switch_task_namespaces(struct nsproxy *ns, struct task_struct *p) +{ + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(p); + struct nsproxy *new = p->nsproxy; + + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) + return; + audit_netns_contid_del(ns->net_ns, contid); + if (new) + audit_netns_contid_add(new->net_ns, contid); +} + void audit_panic(const char *message) { switch (audit_failure) { @@ -1641,7 +1718,6 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV, .groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_MAX, }; - struct audit_net *aunet = net_generic(net, audit_net_id); aunet->sk = netlink_kernel_create(net, NETLINK_AUDIT, &cfg); @@ -1650,7 +1726,8 @@ static int __net_init audit_net_init(struct net *net) return -ENOMEM; } aunet->sk->sk_sndtimeo = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT; - + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aunet->contid_list); + spin_lock_init(&aunet->contid_list_lock); return 0; } @@ -2460,6 +2537,7 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) uid_t uid; struct tty_struct *tty; char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; + struct net *net = task->nsproxy->net_ns; task_lock(task); /* Can't set if audit disabled */ @@ -2530,6 +2608,11 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) conterror: spin_unlock(&audit_contid_list_lock); } + if (!rc) { + if (audit_contid_valid(oldcontid)) + audit_netns_contid_del(net, oldcontid); + audit_netns_contid_add(net, contid); + } task_unlock(task); if (!audit_enabled) diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c index c815f58e6bc0..bbdb5bbf5446 100644 --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep; @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy; struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns); struct nsproxy *new_ns; + u64 contid = audit_get_contid(tsk); if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET | @@ -163,6 +165,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) return PTR_ERR(new_ns); tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; + audit_netns_contid_add(new_ns->net_ns, contid); return 0; } @@ -220,6 +223,7 @@ void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *p, struct nsproxy *new) ns = p->nsproxy; p->nsproxy = new; task_unlock(p); + audit_switch_task_namespaces(ns, p); if (ns && atomic_dec_and_test(&ns->count)) free_nsproxy(ns); -- 1.8.3.1