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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id c54si1467031edb.230.2019.09.26.07.48.47; Thu, 26 Sep 2019 07:49:11 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727204AbfIZOqw (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:46:52 -0400 Received: from charlotte.tuxdriver.com ([70.61.120.58]:35738 "EHLO smtp.tuxdriver.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725820AbfIZOqv (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:46:51 -0400 Received: from cpe-2606-a000-111b-43ee-0-0-0-115f.dyn6.twc.com ([2606:a000:111b:43ee::115f] helo=localhost) by smtp.tuxdriver.com with esmtpsa (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.63) (envelope-from ) id 1iDV2R-0002Jk-6y; Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:46:42 -0400 Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 10:46:29 -0400 From: Neil Horman To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore , sgrubb@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, eparis@parisplace.org, serge@hallyn.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, dwalsh@redhat.com, mpatel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V7 04/21] audit: convert to contid list to check for orch/engine ownership Message-ID: <20190926144629.GB7235@hmswarspite.think-freely.org> References: <6fb4e270bfafef3d0477a06b0365fdcc5a5305b5.1568834524.git.rgb@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <6fb4e270bfafef3d0477a06b0365fdcc5a5305b5.1568834524.git.rgb@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.12.1 (2019-06-15) X-Spam-Score: -2.9 (--) X-Spam-Status: No Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 09:22:21PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Store the audit container identifier in a refcounted kernel object that > is added to the master list of audit container identifiers. This will > allow multiple container orchestrators/engines to work on the same > machine without danger of inadvertantly re-using an existing identifier. > It will also allow an orchestrator to inject a process into an existing > container by checking if the original container owner is the one > injecting the task. A hash table list is used to optimize searches. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 26 ++++++++++++++-- > kernel/audit.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > kernel/audit.h | 8 +++++ > 3 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index f2e3b81f2942..e317807cdd3e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -95,10 +95,18 @@ struct audit_ntp_data { > struct audit_ntp_data {}; > #endif > > +struct audit_cont { > + struct list_head list; > + u64 id; > + struct task_struct *owner; > + refcount_t refcount; > + struct rcu_head rcu; > +}; > + > struct audit_task_info { > kuid_t loginuid; > unsigned int sessionid; > - u64 contid; > + struct audit_cont *cont; > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > struct audit_context *ctx; > #endif > @@ -203,11 +211,15 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) > > static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > - if (!tsk->audit) > + if (!tsk->audit || !tsk->audit->cont) > return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > - return tsk->audit->contid; > + return tsk->audit->cont->id; > } > > +extern struct audit_cont *audit_cont(struct task_struct *tsk); > + > +extern void audit_cont_put(struct audit_cont *cont); > + I see that you manual increment this refcount at various call sites, why no corresponding audit_contid_hold function? Neil > extern u32 audit_enabled; > > extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); > @@ -277,6 +289,14 @@ static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > } > > +static inline struct audit_cont *audit_cont(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return NULL; > +} > + > +static inline void audit_cont_put(struct audit_cont *cont) > +{ } > + > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF > > static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index a36ea57cbb61..ea0899130cc1 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ struct audit_net { > > /* Hash for inode-based rules */ > struct list_head audit_inode_hash[AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS]; > +/* Hash for contid-based rules */ > +struct list_head audit_contid_hash[AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS]; > > static struct kmem_cache *audit_buffer_cache; > > @@ -204,6 +206,8 @@ struct audit_reply { > > static struct kmem_cache *audit_task_cache; > > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_contid_list_lock); > + > void __init audit_task_init(void) > { > audit_task_cache = kmem_cache_create("audit_task", > @@ -231,7 +235,9 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > } > info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); > - info->contid = audit_get_contid(current); > + info->cont = audit_cont(current); > + if (info->cont) > + refcount_inc(&info->cont->refcount); > tsk->audit = info; > > ret = audit_alloc_syscall(tsk); > @@ -246,7 +252,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > .loginuid = INVALID_UID, > .sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET, > - .contid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET, > + .cont = NULL, > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > .ctx = NULL, > #endif > @@ -266,6 +272,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. > */ > + spin_lock(&audit_contid_list_lock); > + audit_cont_put(tsk->audit->cont); > + spin_unlock(&audit_contid_list_lock); > info = tsk->audit; > tsk->audit = NULL; > kmem_cache_free(audit_task_cache, info); > @@ -1657,6 +1666,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) > for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++) > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_inode_hash[i]); > > + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS; i++) > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_contid_hash[i]); > + > mutex_init(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock); > audit_cmd_mutex.owner = NULL; > > @@ -2356,6 +2368,32 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); > } > > +struct audit_cont *audit_cont(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (!tsk->audit || !tsk->audit->cont) > + return NULL; > + return tsk->audit->cont; > +} > + > +/* audit_contid_list_lock must be held by caller */ > +void audit_cont_put(struct audit_cont *cont) > +{ > + if (!cont) > + return; > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { > + put_task_struct(cont->owner); > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); > + } > +} > + > +static struct task_struct *audit_cont_owner(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (tsk->audit && tsk->audit->cont) > + return tsk->audit->cont->owner; > + return NULL; > +} > + > /* > * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid > * @task: target task > @@ -2382,9 +2420,12 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > } > oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task); > read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > - /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ > + /* Don't allow the contid to be unset */ > if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > rc = -EINVAL; > + /* Don't allow the contid to be set to the same value again */ > + else if (contid == oldcontid) { > + rc = -EADDRINUSE; > /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > rc = -EPERM; > @@ -2397,8 +2438,43 @@ int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > else if (audit_contid_set(task)) > rc = -ECHILD; > read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > - if (!rc) > - task->audit->contid = contid; > + if (!rc) { > + struct audit_cont *oldcont = audit_cont(task); > + struct audit_cont *cont = NULL; > + struct audit_cont *newcont = NULL; > + int h = audit_hash_contid(contid); > + > + spin_lock(&audit_contid_list_lock); > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, &audit_contid_hash[h], list) > + if (cont->id == contid) { > + /* task injection to existing container */ > + if (current == cont->owner) { > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); > + newcont = cont; > + } else { > + rc = -ENOTUNIQ; > + goto conterror; > + } > + } > + if (!newcont) { > + newcont = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_cont), GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (newcont) { > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newcont->list); > + newcont->id = contid; > + get_task_struct(current); > + newcont->owner = current; > + refcount_set(&newcont->refcount, 1); > + list_add_rcu(&newcont->list, &audit_contid_hash[h]); > + } else { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + goto conterror; > + } > + } > + task->audit->cont = newcont; > + audit_cont_put(oldcont); > +conterror: > + spin_unlock(&audit_contid_list_lock); > + } > task_unlock(task); > > if (!audit_enabled) > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index 16bd03b88e0d..e4a31aa92dfe 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino) > return (ino & (AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS-1)); > } > > +#define AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS 32 > +extern struct list_head audit_contid_hash[AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS]; > + > +static inline int audit_hash_contid(u64 contid) > +{ > + return (contid & (AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS-1)); > +} > + > /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ > #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 > > -- > 1.8.3.1 > >