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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id q4si5354953ejb.136.2019.10.11.07.09.24; Fri, 11 Oct 2019 07:09:48 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728719AbfJKOGS (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 11 Oct 2019 10:06:18 -0400 Received: from inca-roads.misterjones.org ([213.251.177.50]:60603 "EHLO inca-roads.misterjones.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728691AbfJKOGP (ORCPT ); Fri, 11 Oct 2019 10:06:15 -0400 Received: from 78.163-31-62.static.virginmediabusiness.co.uk ([62.31.163.78] helo=why) by cheepnis.misterjones.org with esmtpsa (TLSv1.2:AES256-GCM-SHA384:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1iIvYa-0007hw-Ao; Fri, 11 Oct 2019 16:06:12 +0200 Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2019 15:06:10 +0100 From: Marc Zyngier To: Mark Rutland Cc: Sai Prakash Ranjan , rnayak@codeaurora.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jeremy.linton@arm.com, bjorn.andersson@linaro.org, linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, andrew.murray@arm.com, will@kernel.org, Dave.Martin@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Subject: Re: Relax CPU features sanity checking on heterogeneous architectures Message-ID: <20191011150610.4e528a2d@why> In-Reply-To: <20191011135431.GB33537@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20191011105010.GA29364@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> <20191011143343.541da66c@why> <20191011135431.GB33537@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> Organization: Approximate X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.17.4 (GTK+ 2.24.32; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 62.31.163.78 X-SA-Exim-Rcpt-To: mark.rutland@arm.com, saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org, rnayak@codeaurora.org, suzuki.poulose@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jeremy.linton@arm.com, bjorn.andersson@linaro.org, linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, andrew.murray@arm.com, will@kernel.org, Dave.Martin@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: maz@kernel.org X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cheepnis.misterjones.org); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 11 Oct 2019 14:54:31 +0100 Mark Rutland wrote: > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 02:33:43PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote: > > On Fri, 11 Oct 2019 11:50:11 +0100 > > Mark Rutland wrote: > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 11:19:00AM +0530, Sai Prakash Ranjan wrote: > > > > On latest QCOM SoCs like SM8150 and SC7180 with big.LITTLE arch, below > > > > warnings are observed during bootup of big cpu cores. > > > > > > For reference, which CPUs are in those SoCs? > > > > > > > SM8150: > > > > > > > > [ 0.271177] CPU features: SANITY CHECK: Unexpected variation in > > > > SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1. Boot CPU: 0x00000011112222, CPU4: 0x00000011111112 > > > > > > The differing fields are EL3, EL2, and EL1: the boot CPU supports > > > AArch64 and AArch32 at those exception levels, while the secondary only > > > supports AArch64. > > > > > > Do we handle this variation in KVM? > > > > We do, at least at vcpu creation time (see kvm_reset_vcpu). But if one > > of the !AArch32 CPU comes in late in the game (after we've started a > > guest), all bets are off (we'll schedule the 32bit guest on that CPU, > > enter the guest, immediately take an Illegal Exception Return, and > > return to userspace with KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY). > > Ouch. We certainly can't remove the warning untill we deal with that > somehow, then. Indeed. Same thing applies for hot-removing the AArch32-capable CPUs, by the way. You'd end-up in a situation where guests can't run, despite the initial contract that we're happy that configuration. > > Not sure we could do better, given the HW. My preference would be to > > fail these CPUs if they aren't present at boot time. > > I agree; I think we need logic to check the ID register fields against > their EXACT, {LOWER,HIGHER}_SAFE, etc rules regardless of whether we > have an associated cap. That can then abort a late onlining of a CPU > which violates those rules w.r.t. the finalised system value. > > I suspect that we may want to split the notion of > safe-for-{user,kernel-guest} in the feature tables, as if nothing else > it will force us to consider those cases separately when adding new > stuff. Probably. There are bizarre overlaps, in the sense that some capabilities (such as this AArch32 EL1 support) are firmly kernel related, and yet have a direct impact on userspace. KVM blurs the lines in "interesting" ways... :-(. Thanks, M. -- Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...