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Date:   Fri, 11 Oct 2019 11:47:34 -0400
From:   Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org,
        primiano@google.com, rsavitski@google.com, jeffv@google.com,
        kernel-team@android.com, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        bpf@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
        "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
Message-ID: <20191011154734.GA105106@google.com>
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On Fri, Oct 11, 2019 at 09:05:43AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 10, 2019 at 02:31:14PM -0400, Joel Fernandes wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 10, 2019 at 07:09:49PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> 
> > > Yes, I did notice, I found it weird.
> > > 
> > > If you have CAP_IPC_LIMIT you should be able to bust mlock memory
> > > limits, so I don't see why we should further relate that to paranoid.
> > > 
> > > The way I wrote it, we also allow to bust the limit if we have disabled
> > > all paranoid checks. Which makes some sense I suppose.
> > > 
> > > The original commit is this:
> > > 
> > >   459ec28ab404 ("perf_counter: Allow mmap if paranoid checks are turned off")
> > 
> > I am thinking we can just a new function perf_is_paranoid() that has nothing
> > to do with the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check and doesn't have tracepoint wording:
> > 
> > static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
> > {
> > 	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
> > }
> > 
> > And then call that from the mmap() code:
> > if (locked > lock_limit && perf_is_paranoid() && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
> > 	return -EPERM;
> > }
> > 
> > I don't think we need to add selinux security checks here since we are
> > already adding security checks earlier in mmap(). This will make the code and
> > its intention more clear and in line with the commit 459ec28ab404 you
> > mentioned. Thoughts?
> 
> Mostly that I'm confused by the current code ;-)
> 
> Like I said, CAP_IPC_LIMIT on its own should already allow busting the
> limit, I don't really see why we should make it conditional on paranoid.
> 
> But if you want to preserve behaviour (arguably a sane thing for your
> patch) then yes, feel free to do as you propose.

Ok, I will do it as I proposed above and resend patch today. Thanks!

 - Joel