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Date:   Tue, 15 Oct 2019 20:35:00 -0400
From:   Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, rostedt@goodmis.org,
        primiano@google.com, rsavitski@google.com, jeffv@google.com,
        kernel-team@android.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
        bpf@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
        "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@kernel.org>,
        Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks
Message-ID: <20191016003500.GC89937@google.com>
References: <20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org>
 <c5bd06a4-54a4-b56e-457c-df36f05d2e3f@tycho.nsa.gov>
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> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> > index bb7b271397a6..2af95f937a5b 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
> > @@ -427,6 +427,15 @@ struct perf_event_attr {
> >   	__u16	__reserved_2;	/* align to __u64 */
> >   };
> > +
> > +/* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
> > +#define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
> > +
> > +/* Finer grained perf_event_open(2) access control. */
> > +#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU		1
> > +#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL		2
> > +#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT	3
> > +
> 
> Why are these definitions part of the uapi header and not private to the
> kernel?

No reason but I agree it is better to put them in the private header.

Peter, if you are Ok with it, could you squash the below diff into my
original patch? But let me know if you want me to resend the whole patch
again. Thanks.

---8<-----------------------

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 664bb7f99c46..587ae4d002f5 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1245,6 +1245,14 @@ extern int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 int perf_event_max_stack_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
 
+/* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
+
+/* Finer grained perf_event_open(2) access control. */
+#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU		1
+#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL		2
+#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT	3
+
 static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 {
 	return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
index 2af95f937a5b..bb7b271397a6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -427,15 +427,6 @@ struct perf_event_attr {
 	__u16	__reserved_2;	/* align to __u64 */
 };
 
-
-/* Access to perf_event_open(2) syscall. */
-#define PERF_SECURITY_OPEN		0
-
-/* Finer grained perf_event_open(2) access control. */
-#define PERF_SECURITY_CPU		1
-#define PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL		2
-#define PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT	3
-
 /*
  * Structure used by below PERF_EVENT_IOC_QUERY_BPF command
  * to query bpf programs attached to the same perf tracepoint
-- 
2.23.0.700.g56cf767bdb-goog