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Tsirkin" , Radim =?utf-8?B?S3LEjW3DocWZ?= Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 1/7] KVM: CPUID: Fix IA32_XSS support in CPUID(0xd,i) enumeration Message-ID: <20191017194622.GI20903@linux.intel.com> References: <20190927021927.23057-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> <20190927021927.23057-2-weijiang.yang@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Oct 02, 2019 at 10:26:10AM -0700, Jim Mattson wrote: > On Thu, Sep 26, 2019 at 7:17 PM Yang Weijiang wrote: > > @@ -414,6 +419,50 @@ static inline void do_cpuid_7_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index) > > } > > } > > > > +static inline void do_cpuid_0xd_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index) > > +{ > > + unsigned int f_xsaves = kvm_x86_ops->xsaves_supported() ? F(XSAVES) : 0; > > Does Intel have CPUs that support XSAVES but don't support the "enable > XSAVES/XRSTORS" VM-execution control? I doubt it. > If so, what is the behavior of XSAVESXRSTORS on those CPUs in VMX > non-root mode? #UD. If not, the CPU would be in violation of the SDM: If the "enable XSAVES/XRSTORS" VM-execution control is 0, XRSTORS causes an invalid-opcode exception (#UD). > If not, why is this conditional F(XSAVES) here? Because it's technically legal for the control to not be supported even if the host doesn't have support. > > + /* cpuid 0xD.1.eax */ > > + const u32 kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features = > > + F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | f_xsaves; > > + u64 u_supported = kvm_supported_xcr0(); > > + u64 s_supported = kvm_supported_xss(); > > + u64 supported; > > + > > + switch (index) { > > + case 0: > > + entry->eax &= u_supported; > > + entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(u_supported, false); > > EBX could actually be zero, couldn't it? Since this output is > context-dependent, I'm not sure how to interpret it when returned from > KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID. *sigh*. It took me something like ten read throughs to understand what you're saying. Yes, it could be zero, though that ship may have sailed since the previous code reported a non-zero value. Whatever is done, KVM should be consistent for all indices, i.e. either report zero or the max size. > > + entry->ecx = entry->ebx; > > + entry->edx = 0; > > Shouldn't this be: entry->edx &= u_supported >> 32? Probably. The confusion likely stems from this wording in the SDM, where it states the per-bit behavior and then also says all bits are reserved. I think it makes sense to do as Jim suggested, and defer the reserved bit handling to kvm_supported_{xcr0,xss}(). Bit 31 - 00: Reports the supported bits of the upper 32 bits of XCR0. XCR0[n+32] can be set to 1 only if EDX[n] is 1. Bits 31 - 00: Reserved > > + break; > > + case 1: > > + supported = u_supported | s_supported; > > + entry->eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features; > > + cpuid_mask(&entry->eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX); > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + entry->edx = 0; > > Shouldn't this be: entry->edx &= s_supported >> 32? Same as above. > > + entry->ecx &= s_supported; > > + if (entry->eax & (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC))) > > + entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, true); > > As above, can't EBX just be zero, since it's context-dependent? What > is the context when processing KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID? And why do we > only fill this in when XSAVES or XSAVEC is supported? > > > + break; > > + default: > > + supported = (entry->ecx & 1) ? s_supported : u_supported; > > + if (!(supported & ((u64)1 << index))) { > > Nit: 1ULL << index. Even better: BIT_ULL(index) > > + entry->eax = 0; > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + entry->ecx = 0; > > + entry->edx = 0; > > + return; > > + } > > + if (entry->ecx) > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > This seems to back up my claims above regarding the EBX output for > cases 0 and 1, but aside from those subleaves, is this correct? For > subleaves > 1, ECX bit 1 can be set for extended state components that > need to be cache-line aligned. Such components could map to a valid > bit in XCR0 and have a non-zero offset from the beginning of the > non-compacted XSAVE area. > > > + entry->edx = 0; > > This seems too aggressive. See my comments above regarding EDX outputs > for cases 0 and 1. > > > + break; > > + } > > +}