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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sat, 19 Oct 2019 19:06:31 +0100 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9JI6U6F60489764 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 19 Oct 2019 18:06:30 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1086F5204E; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 18:06:30 +0000 (GMT) Received: from swastik.ibm.com (unknown [9.85.146.216]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 581495204F; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 18:06:27 +0000 (GMT) From: Nayna Jain To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Mimi Zohar , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Nayna Jain , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Subject: [PATCH v8 1/8] powerpc: detect the secure boot mode of the system Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2019 14:06:10 -0400 X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.3.1 In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1571508377-23603-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19101918-0020-0000-0000-0000037B06EA X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19101918-0021-0000-0000-000021D1391E Message-Id: <1571508377-23603-2-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-19_04:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910190171 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of a PowerNV system. The PPC_SECURE_BOOT config represents the base enablement of secure boot for powerpc. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 10 +++++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index 3e56c9c2f16e..56ea0019b616 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -934,6 +934,16 @@ config PPC_MEM_KEYS If unsure, say y. +config PPC_SECURE_BOOT + prompt "Enable secure boot support" + bool + depends on PPC_POWERNV + help + Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security + policies to extend secure boot to the OS. This config allows a user + to enable OS secure boot on systems that have firmware support for + it. If in doubt say N. + endmenu config ISA_DMA_API diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07d0fe0ca81f --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secure_boot.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Secure boot definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ +#ifndef _ASM_POWER_SECURE_BOOT_H +#define _ASM_POWER_SECURE_BOOT_H + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT + +bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void); + +#else + +static inline bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) +{ + return false; +} + +#endif +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile index a7ca8fe62368..e2a54fa240ac 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile @@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o + # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code GCOV_PROFILE_prom_init.o := n KCOV_INSTRUMENT_prom_init.o := n diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..99bba7915629 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ +#include +#include +#include + +bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) +{ + struct device_node *node; + bool enabled = false; + + node = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "ibm,secvar-v1"); + if (!of_device_is_available(node)) { + pr_err("Cannot find secure variable node in device tree; failing to secure state\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* + * secureboot is enabled if os-secure-enforcing property exists, + * else disabled. + */ + enabled = of_property_read_bool(node, "os-secure-enforcing"); + +out: + pr_info("Secure boot mode %s\n", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return enabled; +} -- 2.20.1