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Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima
 policy rules
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
        Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
        George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
        Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
        Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
        "Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Date:   Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:16:57 -0400
In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
References: <1571508377-23603-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
         <1571508377-23603-3-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
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On Sat, 2019-10-19 at 14:06 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote:

> index 000000000000..65d82ee74ea4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation
> + * Author: Nayna Jain
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include <asm/secure_boot.h>
> +
> +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
> +{
> +	return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
> + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
> + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good signature
> + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature.

Please add another sentence or two as a separate paragraph with an
explanation why the kernel module rule is conditional (eg. Only verify
the appended kernel module signatures once.)

> + */
> +static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
> +	"appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> +	"appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> +#endif
> +	NULL
> +};
> +

Mimi