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Date:   Mon, 21 Oct 2019 19:57:34 -0400
From:   Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc:     containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
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        nhorman@tuxdriver.com, Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
        mpatel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V7 20/21] audit: add capcontid to set contid
 outside init_user_ns
Message-ID: <20191021235734.mgcjotdqoe73e4ha@madcap2.tricolour.ca>
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On 2019-10-21 17:43, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 21, 2019 at 5:38 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote=
:
> > On 2019-10-21 15:53, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2019 at 9:39 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> w=
rote:
> > > > On 2019-09-18 21:22, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > > Provide a mechanism similar to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to explicitly gi=
ve a
> > > > > process in a non-init user namespace the capability to set audit
> > > > > container identifiers.
> > > > >
> > > > > Use audit netlink message types AUDIT_GET_CAPCONTID 1027 and
> > > > > AUDIT_SET_CAPCONTID 1028.  The message format includes the data
> > > > > structure:
> > > > > struct audit_capcontid_status {
> > > > >         pid_t   pid;
> > > > >         u32     enable;
> > > > > };
> > > >
> > > > Paul, can I get a review of the general idea here to see if you're =
ok
> > > > with this way of effectively extending CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL for the sa=
ke of
> > > > setting contid from beyond the init user namespace where capable() =
can't
> > > > reach and ns_capable() is meaningless for these purposes?
> > >
> > > I think my previous comment about having both the procfs and netlink
> > > interfaces apply here.  I don't see why we need two different APIs at
> > > the start; explain to me why procfs isn't sufficient.  If the argumen=
t
> > > is simply the desire to avoid mounting procfs in the container, how
> > > many container orchestrators can function today without a valid /proc=
?
> >
> > Ok, sorry, I meant to address that question from a previous patch
> > comment at the same time.
> >
> > It was raised by Eric Biederman that the proc filesystem interface for
> > audit had its limitations and he had suggested an audit netlink
> > interface made more sense.
>=20
> I'm sure you've got it handy, so I'm going to be lazy and ask: archive
> pointer to Eric's comments?  Just a heads-up, I'm really *not* a fan
> of using the netlink interface for this, so unless Eric presents a
> super compelling reason for why we shouldn't use procfs I'm inclined
> to stick with /proc.

It was actually a video call with Eric and Steve where that was
recommended, so I can't provide you with any first-hand communication
about it.  I'll get more details...

So, with that out of the way, could you please comment on the general
idea of what was intended to be the central idea of this mechanism to be
able to nest containers beyond the initial user namespace (knowing that
a /proc interface is available and the audit netlink interface isn't
necessary for it to work and the latter can be easily removed)?

> > The intent was to switch to the audit netlink interface for contid,
> > capcontid and to add the audit netlink interface for loginuid and
> > sessionid while deprecating the proc interface for loginuid and
> > sessionid.  This was alluded to in the cover letter, but not very clear=
,
> > I'm afraid.  I have patches to remove the contid and loginuid/sessionid
> > interfaces in another tree which is why I had forgotten to outline that
> > plan more explicitly in the cover letter.
>=20
> paul moore

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635