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Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] powerpc/ima: add support to initialize ima
 policy rules
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To:     Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
        Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
        Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
        Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
        Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
        George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
        Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
        Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
        "Oliver O'Halloran" <oohall@gmail.com>,
        Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 26 Oct 2019 19:52:03 -0400
In-Reply-To: <27dbe08e-5473-4dd0-d2ad-2df591e23f5e@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
References: <20191024034717.70552-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
         <20191024034717.70552-3-nayna@linux.ibm.com>
         <dd7e04fc-25e8-280f-b565-bdb031939655@linux.microsoft.com>
         <27dbe08e-5473-4dd0-d2ad-2df591e23f5e@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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On Fri, 2019-10-25 at 12:02 -0500, Nayna Jain wrote:
> On 10/24/19 12:35 PM, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> > On 10/23/2019 8:47 PM, Nayna Jain wrote:
> >
> >> +/*
> >> + * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems.
> >> + * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
> >> + * The "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" option allows the known good 
> >> signature
> >> + * to be stored as an xattr or as an appended signature.
> >> + *
> >> + * To avoid duplicate signature verification as much as possible, 
> >> the IMA
> >> + * policy rule for module appraisal is added only if 
> >> CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> >> + * is not enabled.
> >> + */
> >> +static const char *const secure_rules[] = {
> >> +    "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> >> +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE
> >> +    "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig",
> >> +#endif
> >> +    NULL
> >> +};
> >
> > Is there any way to not use conditional compilation in the above array 
> > definition? Maybe define different functions to get "secure_rules" for 
> > when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE is defined and when it is not defined.
> 
> How will you decide which function to be called ?

You could call "is_module_sig_enforced()".

Mimi