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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:10:34 -0000 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06avi18626390.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9VC9xXx34668934 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:09:59 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0EEE11C05E; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:10:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0302E11C04C; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:10:32 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.80.194.174]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 31 Oct 2019 12:10:31 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/9] KEYS: Defined an IMA hook to measure keys on key create or update From: Mimi Zohar To: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian , dhowells@redhat.com, matthewgarrett@google.com, sashal@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: prsriva@linux.microsoft.com Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2019 08:10:31 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20191031011910.2574-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20191031011910.2574-1-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> <20191031011910.2574-2-nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19103112-0016-0000-0000-000002BF7A23 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19103112-0017-0000-0000-00003320DD7B Message-Id: <1572523831.5028.43.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-31_05:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910310125 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 2019-10-30 at 18:19 -0700, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote: > Asymmetric keys used for verifying file signatures or certificates > are currently not included in the IMA measurement list. > > This patch defines a new IMA hook namely ima_post_key_create_or_update() > to measure asymmetric keys. It's not enough for the kernel to be able to compile the kernel after applying all the patches in a patch set.  After applying each patch, the kernel should build properly, otherwise it is not bi-sect safe.  Refer to "3) Separate your changes" of "Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst.   > > Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 997a57137351..22d0628faf56 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > #include "../integrity.h" > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 492b8f241d39..18e1bc105be7 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -635,6 +635,9 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, > int action = 0; > u32 secid; > > + if (!ima_policy_flag) > + return; > + > if (func) { > security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); > action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, > @@ -695,6 +698,29 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) > } > } > > +/** > + * ima_post_key_create_or_update - measure asymmetric keys > + * @keyring: keyring to which the key is linked to > + * @key: created or updated key > + * @flags: key flags > + * @create: flag indicating whether the key was created or updated > + * > + * Keys can only be measured, not appraised. > + */ > +void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, > + unsigned long flags, bool create) > +{ > + const struct public_key *pk; > + > + if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric) > + return; > + > + pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; > + process_buffer_measurement(pk->key, pk->keylen, > + keyring->description, > + NONE, 0); This patch should also define the new "func". Mimi > +} > + > static int __init init_ima(void) > { > int error;