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Date:   Fri, 1 Nov 2019 08:32:38 -0700
From:   Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
        dave.hansen@intel.com, nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
        serge.ayoun@intel.com, shay.katz-zamir@intel.com,
        haitao.huang@intel.com, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
        tglx@linutronix.de, kai.svahn@intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
        josh@joshtriplett.org, luto@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com,
        rientjes@google.com, cedric.xing@intel.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v23 12/24] x86/sgx: Linux Enclave Driver
Message-ID: <20191101153238.GA2657@linux.intel.com>
References: <20191028210324.12475-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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 <173a196e-fa6b-23b8-c818-dfca6cdadcc6@tycho.nsa.gov>
 <20191031211721.GD10507@linux.intel.com>
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On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 09:28:17AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 11/1/19 9:16 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> >So, IIUC, that means that merging the driver will create a regression with
> >respect to LSM control over executable mappings that will only be
> >rectified at some future point in time if/when someone submits LSM hooks
> >or calls to existing hooks to restore such control.? That doesn't seem
> >like a good idea.? Why can't you include at least that basic level of
> >control now?? It is one thing to defer finer grained control or
> >SGX-specific access controls to the future - that I can understand.? But
> >introducing a regression in the existing controls is not really ok.
> 
> Unless you are arguing that the existing checks on mmap/mprotect of
> /dev/sgx/enclave are a coarse-grained approximation (effectively requiring
> WX to the file or execmem for any user of SGX).

Yes, that's the argument as running any enclave will require RWX access to
/dev/sgx/enclave.  EXECMEM won't trigger for SGX users as /dev/sgx/enclave
must be MAP_SHARED and it's a non-private file (not backed by anonymous
inode, in case I got the file terminology wrong).