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Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is
 trustworthy
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc:     kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
        Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
        Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
References: <20191105161737.21395-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
 <20191105200218.GF3079@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net>
From:   Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Message-ID: <51c9fe0c-0bda-978c-27f7-85fe7e59e91d@redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 6 Nov 2019 00:51:30 +0100
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On 05/11/19 21:02, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 05:17:37PM +0100, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>> Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware
>> vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely,
>> use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the
>> decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
>> missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake'
>> and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can
>> actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing
>> core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
>>
>> Add two feature bits to KVM: KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT with the meaning
>> that KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT bit answers the question if the exposed SMT
>> topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get
>> away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards
>> compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
> 
> The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the
> vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.

This is a subset of the requirements for "trustworthy" SMT.  You can have:

- vCPUs pinned to two threads in the same core and exposed as multiple
cores in the guest

- vCPUs from different guests pinned to two threads in the same core

and that would be okay as far as KVM_HINTS_REALTIME is concerned, but
would still allow exploitation of side-channels, respectively within the
VM and between VMs.

Paolo

> And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it
> used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to
> find it in a hurry.
> 
> So I would much rather you have a bit that indicates the 1:1 vcpu/cpu
> mapping and if that is set accept the topology information and otherwise
> completely ignore it.
>