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Long" , Sasha Levin , Ard Biesheuvel Subject: [PATCH 4.4 64/75] ARM: 8795/1: spectre-v1.1: use put_user() for __put_user() Date: Fri, 8 Nov 2019 19:50:21 +0100 Message-Id: <20191108174805.004326669@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.0 In-Reply-To: <20191108174708.135680837@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20191108174708.135680837@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Julien Thierry Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream. When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make __put_user() an alias of put_user(). Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: David A. Long Reviewed-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -408,6 +408,14 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE +/* + * When mitigating Spectre variant 1.1, all accessors need to include + * verification of the address space. + */ +#define __put_user(x, ptr) put_user(x, ptr) + +#else #define __put_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ long __pu_err = 0; \ @@ -415,12 +423,6 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) -#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ -({ \ - __put_user_switch((x), (ptr), (err), __put_user_nocheck); \ - (void) 0; \ -}) - #define __put_user_nocheck(x, __pu_ptr, __err, __size) \ do { \ unsigned long __pu_addr = (unsigned long)__pu_ptr; \ @@ -500,6 +502,7 @@ do { \ : "r" (x), "i" (-EFAULT) \ : "cc") +#endif /* !CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern unsigned long __must_check