Received: by 2002:a25:7ec1:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id z184csp4539132ybc; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 06:20:12 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwnYtFDCcaMI6vLQH7MuuUmqyvVfhrKvfxjWQZzAEFtbI5pIdgCtVSa6VTqdg+oD7OVjYbi X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:c293:: with SMTP id r19mr1224373ejz.69.1573827612122; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 06:20:12 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1573827612; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=fv09mKy184Bgj/YF3yphyUDM2nCvzf+PhHpSRZdOpK8zUK3s6tq21sSYn0Fvi9qiug iWmL02VvwsB6UGeSW9p2lgRR5bQ7hGQveBgLcq+8ASny6XALmrbEoXe3gcGh0yZNENsd dY5piIb0gpDyK09LJvQDsqCKFZ2fM9/Jvzk3EbKiuOtIHZ35lP5h7wpZDQPc48M/1ux7 qyNwpI+yj3+y23JePd3bY4YVoQ7ofmL7XJpCDUnv+4AkWBe5oUWiT8tu5DaQxqo3/2/X 4weGGhPJbWs0DqBcmJX0FtZx9oOAn0f1JbRyASx2RcJ9roXuBkSV39iH4W3M2y79vPfU aMXA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=9krPwWFD5V97ExVQ4zmy3pVlx+NIOvaawAfoD9nIn0M=; b=kiUpb6RevXYxfzeFsNpiS6v3+dfyt4izyahZtuOFo3bnr4Sd7l09HShJsXItdfiq9z Q4l5mDJzQoRZKzrGLpWpMkHUvzr4sHxWLvJSkO9ZYSw8MsKDy/mca5l2LaJ5058Ex8vt PQ6LlzOgxjn41+EEfMkpyRQjKNh3raX5CXYrsbCFuDKxUfYqg7qwQ7LcP5GR0dKmV+Cb niiNzbVAmYcKtGQo2pvtedSPj9uIYILtRmZbVE5YobaZKyXEv6myvQsd6My6dbEWq4Jv UktbHJTxLj0ttNJutSL1Mce0ZrowUO4XMbSaVUL5h/0hbnPaKE4+qgQLhmEDsSh/RGRG 3TmQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id dv23si5436279ejb.338.2019.11.15.06.19.46; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 06:20:12 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727635AbfKOORD (ORCPT + 99 others); Fri, 15 Nov 2019 09:17:03 -0500 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]:59848 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727585AbfKOORD (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 Nov 2019 09:17:03 -0500 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 897C431B; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 06:17:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from lakrids.cambridge.arm.com (usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4B8EC3F534; Fri, 15 Nov 2019 06:17:00 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 14:16:58 +0000 From: Mark Rutland To: Kees Cook Cc: Will Deacon , Catalin Marinas , Sami Tolvanen , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Ard Biesheuvel , Dave Martin , Laura Abbott , Marc Zyngier , Nick Desaulniers , Jann Horn , Miguel Ojeda , Masahiro Yamada , clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/14] add support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack Message-ID: <20191115141657.GD41572@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> References: <20191018161033.261971-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <20191105235608.107702-1-samitolvanen@google.com> <201911121530.FA3D7321F@keescook> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <201911121530.FA3D7321F@keescook> User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.1+11 (2f07cb52) (2018-12-01) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 03:44:42PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Nov 05, 2019 at 03:55:54PM -0800, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > > This patch series adds support for Clang's Shadow Call Stack > > (SCS) mitigation, which uses a separately allocated shadow stack > > to protect against return address overwrites. More information > > Will, Catalin, Mark, > > What's the next step here? I *think* all the comments have been > addressed. I'm hoping to look over the remaining bits in the next week or so, and to throw my test boxes at this shortly. Thanks, Mark.