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Biederman" , "Alexander E. Patrakov" , "Ahmed S. Darwish" , "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , Willy Tarreau , Matthew Garrett , Vito Caputo , Andreas Dilger , Jan Kara , Ray Strode , William Jon McCann , zhangjs , Florian Weimer , Lennart Poettering , Nicolai Stange , "Peter, Matthias" , Marcelo Henrique Cerri , Roman Drahtmueller , Neil Horman Subject: Re: [PATCH v25 10/12] LRNG - add TRNG support Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2019 09:58:35 +0100 Message-ID: <19681012.svDddlc5pN@positron.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <20191119124150.GB1975017@kroah.com> References: <5390778.VeFRgus4bQ@positron.chronox.de> <20191119124150.GB1975017@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Am Dienstag, 19. November 2019, 13:41:50 CET schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman: Hi Greg, > On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 02:07:40AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > > As this would introduce a new device file now, is there a special > > > process that I need to follow or do I need to copy? Which major/minor > > > number should I use? > > > > > > Looking into static const struct memdev devlist[] I see > > > > > > [8] = { "random", 0666, &random_fops, 0 }, > > > [9] = { "urandom", 0666, &urandom_fops, 0 }, > > > > > > Shall a true_random be added here with [10]? > > > > I am not at all an expert on chardevs, but this sounds generally > > reasonable. gregkh is probably the real authority here. > > [10] is the aio char device node, so you better not try to overlap it or > bad things will happen :( Thanks for your insights. Which device minor number could we use? Or another idea and apologies if I restart this conversation as there was already a discussion around it: what about extending the getrandom(2) call instead of adding a device file? What about adding yet another flag to getrandom: GRND_TRUERANDOM and process it as follows: if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE| GRND_TRUERANDOM)) return -EINVAL; //From Andy's tree /* * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes * no sense. */ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE| GRND_RANDOM)) return -EINVAL; /* We only allow GRND_TRUERANDOM by itself or with NONBLOCK */ if (! ((flags & GRND_TRUERANDOM) && ((flags == GRND_TRUERANDOM) || (flags == GRND_TRUERANDOM | GRND_NONBLOCK)))) return -EINVAL; if (flags & GRND_TRUERANDOM) { ... do the TRNG processing ... ... may return -ENOPNOTSUPP if no TRNG available ... } Thanks a lot. Ciao Stephan