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Date:   Wed, 20 Nov 2019 11:07:43 -0800
From:   "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
To:     Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc:     Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        "viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
        linuxfs <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>, rcu@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] selinux: Don't call avc_compute_av() from RCU
 path walk
Message-ID: <20191120190743.GT2889@paulmck-ThinkPad-P72>
Reply-To: paulmck@kernel.org
References: <20191119184057.14961-1-will@kernel.org>
 <20191119184057.14961-2-will@kernel.org>
 <5e51f9a5-ba76-a42d-fc2b-9255f8544859@tycho.nsa.gov>
 <20191120131229.GA21500@willie-the-truck>
 <d8dbd290-0ffa-271f-0268-5e9148e7ee9b@tycho.nsa.gov>
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On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 10:28:31AM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 11/20/19 8:12 AM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > Hi Stephen,
> > 
> > Thanks for the quick reply.
> > 
> > On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 01:59:40PM -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > > On 11/19/19 1:40 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > 'avc_compute_av()' can block, so we carefully exit the RCU read-side
> > > > critical section before calling it in 'avc_has_perm_noaudit()'.
> > > > Unfortunately, if we're calling from the VFS layer on the RCU path walk
> > > > via 'selinux_inode_permission()' then we're still actually in an RCU
> > > > read-side critical section and must not block.
> > > 
> > > avc_compute_av() should never block AFAIK. The blocking concern was with
> > > slow_avc_audit(), and even that appears dubious to me. That seems to be more
> > > about misuse of d_find_alias in dump_common_audit_data() than anything.
> > 
> > Apologies, I lost track of GFP_ATOMIC when I reading the code and didn't
> > think it was propagated down to all of the potential allocations and
> > string functions. Having looked at it again, I can't see where it blocks.
> > 
> > Might be worth a comment in avc_compute_av(), because the temporary
> > dropping of rcu_read_lock() looks really dodgy when we could be running
> > on the RCU path walk path anyway.
> 
> I don't think that's a problem but I'll defer to the fsdevel and rcu folks.
> The use of RCU within the SELinux AVC long predates the introduction of RCU
> path walk, and the rcu_read_lock()/unlock() pairs inside the AVC are not
> related in any way to RCU path walk.  Hopefully they don't break it.  The
> SELinux security server (i.e. security_compute_av() and the rest of
> security/selinux/ss/*) internally has its own locking for its data
> structures, primarily the policy rwlock.  There was also a patch long ago to
> convert use of that policy rwlock to RCU but it didn't seem justified at the
> time.  We are interested in revisiting that however.  That would introduce
> its own set of rcu_read_lock/unlock pairs inside of security_compute_av() as
> well.

RCU readers nest, so it should be fine.  (Famous last words...)

							Thanx, Paul