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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id cw24si893984edb.382.2019.11.27.13.14.46; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 13:15:10 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=s3DLB26j; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732643AbfK0VKd (ORCPT + 99 others); Wed, 27 Nov 2019 16:10:33 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:37624 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1733042AbfK0VK1 (ORCPT ); Wed, 27 Nov 2019 16:10:27 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2A6F82176D; Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:10:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1574889026; bh=ugjkPN+O/GVFH6HkmMsSELLNjRIZkhF+p0FMpUghDl0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=s3DLB26jxWL8S/gB3KdfUIdAOCtFpaNCUTen16G78Nms/UFn8ZpcOHXtIOaG87vPv B1wEIw9kZ23icZoT0d5pIIttcPUnfpr7+uT8eFiGUzd1fJ/XCDF6GNi1Goo63LLo58 PtKflKl8X9LrXDsuzQx5u1pld8giu6xMsHgOD7L4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , stable@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 5.3 56/95] x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2019 21:32:13 +0100 Message-Id: <20191127202923.382153935@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.0 In-Reply-To: <20191127202845.651587549@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20191127202845.651587549@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Thomas Gleixner commit 880a98c339961eaa074393e3a2117cbe9125b8bb upstream. The entry stack in the cpu entry area is protected against overflow by the readonly GDT on 64-bit, but on 32-bit the GDT needs to be writeable and therefore does not trigger a fault on stack overflow. Add a guard page. Fixes: c482feefe1ae ("x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h @@ -78,8 +78,12 @@ struct cpu_entry_area { /* * The GDT is just below entry_stack and thus serves (on x86_64) as - * a a read-only guard page. + * a read-only guard page. On 32-bit the GDT must be writeable, so + * it needs an extra guard page. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 + char guard_entry_stack[PAGE_SIZE]; +#endif struct entry_stack_page entry_stack_page; /*