Received: by 2002:a25:8b91:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id j17csp17940553ybl; Thu, 2 Jan 2020 15:13:40 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqx+oGdlPWKSuBrtcKQJhKzbjNssPeBz5zXZwNy7x+GKN2uvDEmXf+mAvjSXvINzCZFus+HW X-Received: by 2002:aca:c509:: with SMTP id v9mr3037908oif.151.1578006819841; Thu, 02 Jan 2020 15:13:39 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1578006819; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=jJLJSXm0otZJoyWH8XGipxzNF1c/4tbPKitE4m4gMyrz5lguspxsf0vDF7LwPXaiFJ pDys/cuEvG4Yqdu0bejhwQtpR8qgZ3lD6eWHkH/ZmsOkZBGj2zRD0CDeB/Dmdp9O6Kyl 79hrjnGYT6Srq/KEZpnbX4/ryK5Csy5RTBr9GVfBB2uZdNjfPQjD8hRzXSbu+Okgs99i +6d8MYx3bioNjhrGn7mXb9qSAO+jyWddLQOCRxaW3R8jORkuitIZKWKNDt6GHeJnkDh+ XlqmNATqDZNLxPeWjUp9xD4zWOuhuicTsJr+0jmHL4smXYmeZdnTUlrT73/6GT55BW/p hOqg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:content-transfer-encoding:mime-version :user-agent:references:in-reply-to:message-id:date:subject:cc:to :from:dkim-signature; bh=0GvP1TzQUUPr6OL5jGrRt9006NBJeZ2YtYzEt2zJ6j0=; b=PwkvibTgpgenLH4OBjReF4u21ai9l0CB/YA3TCiX7UY228a4eWrmwKEaEeXQZNUIFV R1/KkYRQXSP8pyr0DGXi4JellnY95A6XAofi6OmPCgnGgij+qk6xOrPLKH4d5TN/dCYG JS48LMggrJHvW2RlL4F1f2rh1CeOC6pVOz7UFu5qeGTYWznefnA+4gPyLCi+d50D4VIX xHBToccjqck09ziB6XLsEzImumfEkWBC18+RW5NQtkU1hHwINR6Wl8O5bqweI9RnxkxQ X5/NDWX7WAGg9GKamxd7XQtMPz9xlT/VYPHQk66bd6qS7E2FYNMW23wa4GjKvDtx1mJy 77FA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=su5u8NS2; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id 17si12557235oix.22.2020.01.02.15.13.28; Thu, 02 Jan 2020 15:13:39 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=su5u8NS2; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730834AbgABWtc (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:49:32 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:54416 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729545AbgABW0p (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Jan 2020 17:26:45 -0500 Received: from localhost (83-86-89-107.cable.dynamic.v4.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9225320863; Thu, 2 Jan 2020 22:26:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1578004005; bh=lJQC4/Con0Ugxzstlc8xq8amDaSrx9aFFStPvk0jE1s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=su5u8NS2OKip20vXxZ+X+3srh1yzdTIZb8ukx5OnNgSw6Oc7ZHJoc7mm1tdD376Xj X3AJJIGo6+L3Hovb4N5q/i7vF1ER7zN4k8GZ0VJJYKdZ6ZjwqHO6OBzlNv085XLX/6 weTkKpbT0yVlLmRZGSt9/Kt4AwuFE70/YhXiFKBY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Mike Rapoport , Andrea Arcangeli , Daniel Colascione , Jann Horn , Lokesh Gidra , Nick Kralevich , Nosh Minwalla , Pavel Emelyanov , Tim Murray , Aleksa Sarai , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 4.14 54/91] userfaultfd: require CAP_SYS_PTRACE for UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2020 23:07:36 +0100 Message-Id: <20200102220438.300825166@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 In-Reply-To: <20200102220356.856162165@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200102220356.856162165@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Mike Rapoport [ Upstream commit 3c1c24d91ffd536de0a64688a9df7f49e58fadbc ] A while ago Andy noticed (http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALCETrWY+5ynDct7eU_nDUqx=okQvjm=Y5wJvA4ahBja=CQXGw@mail.gmail.com) that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK used by an unprivileged user may have security implications. As the first step of the solution the following patch limits the availably of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for those having CAP_SYS_PTRACE. The usage of CAP_SYS_PTRACE ensures compatibility with CRIU. Yet, if there are other users of non-cooperative userfaultfd that run without CAP_SYS_PTRACE, they would be broken :( Current implementation of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK modifies the file descriptor table from the read() implementation of uffd, which may have security implications for unprivileged use of the userfaultfd. Limit availability of UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK only for callers that have CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1572967777-8812-2-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: Daniel Colascione Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Lokesh Gidra Cc: Nick Kralevich Cc: Nosh Minwalla Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Tim Murray Cc: Aleksa Sarai Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index a609d480606d..e2b2196fd942 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -1807,13 +1807,12 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&uffdio_api, buf, sizeof(uffdio_api))) goto out; features = uffdio_api.features; - if (uffdio_api.api != UFFD_API || (features & ~UFFD_API_FEATURES)) { - memset(&uffdio_api, 0, sizeof(uffdio_api)); - if (copy_to_user(buf, &uffdio_api, sizeof(uffdio_api))) - goto out; - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } + ret = -EINVAL; + if (uffdio_api.api != UFFD_API || (features & ~UFFD_API_FEATURES)) + goto err_out; + ret = -EPERM; + if ((features & UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + goto err_out; /* report all available features and ioctls to userland */ uffdio_api.features = UFFD_API_FEATURES; uffdio_api.ioctls = UFFD_API_IOCTLS; @@ -1826,6 +1825,11 @@ static int userfaultfd_api(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, ret = 0; out: return ret; +err_out: + memset(&uffdio_api, 0, sizeof(uffdio_api)); + if (copy_to_user(buf, &uffdio_api, sizeof(uffdio_api))) + ret = -EFAULT; + goto out; } static long userfaultfd_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, -- 2.20.1