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Date:   Tue, 7 Jan 2020 10:11:32 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To:     Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
        Justin Capella <justincapella@gmail.com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@chromium.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
        Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
        Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>,
        Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@chromium.org>,
        Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>,
        Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: Make trampolines W^X
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On Mon, Jan 06, 2020 at 02:13:18PM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 05, 2020 at 10:33:54AM +0900, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > 
> > >> On Jan 4, 2020, at 8:03 PM, Justin Capella <justincapella@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > ﻿
> > > I'm rather ignorant about this topic but it would make sense to check prior to making executable from a security standpoint wouldn't it? (In support of the (set_memory_ro + set_memory_x)
> > > 
> > 
> > Maybe, depends if it’s structured in a way that’s actually helpful from a security perspective.
> > 
> > It doesn’t help that set_memory_x and friends are not optimized at all. These functions are very, very, very slow and adversely affect all CPUs.
> 
> That was one of the reason it wasn't done in the first.
> Also ftrace trampoline break w^x as well.

Didn't I fix that?