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From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        stable@vger.kernel.org, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>,
        Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 49/68] mac80211: Fix TKIP replay protection immediately after key setup
Date:   Mon,  3 Feb 2020 16:19:45 +0000
Message-Id: <20200203161913.035130758@linuxfoundation.org>
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>

[ Upstream commit 6f601265215a421f425ba3a4850a35861d024643 ]

TKIP replay protection was skipped for the very first frame received
after a new key is configured. While this is potentially needed to avoid
dropping a frame in some cases, this does leave a window for replay
attacks with group-addressed frames at the station side. Any earlier
frame sent by the AP using the same key would be accepted as a valid
frame and the internal RSC would then be updated to the TSC from that
frame. This would allow multiple previously transmitted group-addressed
frames to be replayed until the next valid new group-addressed frame
from the AP is received by the station.

Fix this by limiting the no-replay-protection exception to apply only
for the case where TSC=0, i.e., when this is for the very first frame
protected using the new key, and the local RSC had not been set to a
higher value when configuring the key (which may happen with GTK).

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200107153545.10934-1-j@w1.fi
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/tkip.c | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/tkip.c b/net/mac80211/tkip.c
index b3622823bad23..ebd66e8f46b3f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/tkip.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/tkip.c
@@ -266,9 +266,21 @@ int ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
 	if ((keyid >> 6) != key->conf.keyidx)
 		return TKIP_DECRYPT_INVALID_KEYIDX;
 
-	if (rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT &&
-	    (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 ||
-	     (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 && iv16 <= rx_ctx->iv16)))
+	/* Reject replays if the received TSC is smaller than or equal to the
+	 * last received value in a valid message, but with an exception for
+	 * the case where a new key has been set and no valid frame using that
+	 * key has yet received and the local RSC was initialized to 0. This
+	 * exception allows the very first frame sent by the transmitter to be
+	 * accepted even if that transmitter were to use TSC 0 (IEEE 802.11
+	 * described TSC to be initialized to 1 whenever a new key is taken into
+	 * use).
+	 */
+	if (iv32 < rx_ctx->iv32 ||
+	    (iv32 == rx_ctx->iv32 &&
+	     (iv16 < rx_ctx->iv16 ||
+	      (iv16 == rx_ctx->iv16 &&
+	       (rx_ctx->iv32 || rx_ctx->iv16 ||
+		rx_ctx->ctx.state != TKIP_STATE_NOT_INIT)))))
 		return TKIP_DECRYPT_REPLAY;
 
 	if (only_iv) {
-- 
2.20.1