Received: by 2002:a25:1506:0:0:0:0:0 with SMTP id 6csp4177788ybv; Mon, 10 Feb 2020 14:01:43 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzRq0QB7COPZ4bsKTViHvCwA0Uz0z/PdoL5V0gwyQDe9OMex4kCazfzZydzWk3VS4/VoJRJ X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:8d0:: with SMTP id k16mr845713oij.68.1581372102762; Mon, 10 Feb 2020 14:01:42 -0800 (PST) ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1581372102; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; b=06rGSIfjsp5QKutym/3CAi2ByVuk101AX8vtpN36zZx+FCbwDrzREYgqFX5Lg1bYIg DZwZ8YLF1p4uJPS2cGsYeoSlFUNKUt6wsCByQm3Px9TwaSlv7BM58njbPBrNVRwlTMgw jipkiY6lT78G1Xnbkw2J6NkNKXGp+DJfn0iR0aofuV9VbEGYRe8yr9NZPpdNL85kNejb EIDg9icwMWdmZhIXJpV3aUiE+og+dfI/FT5/f9lWsWmRW8iOFaXcMqIEcHqJnTn6i8da tVtXHBvcxDNTsUd/DaPTryE0H7xejSSGaF7JKtgLnyZqj4cWF9N8KoR3lOMoZ5hgfV6S fuVw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20160816; h=list-id:precedence:sender:user-agent:in-reply-to :content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id:subject:cc :to:from:date; bh=T50CJAr2qXcIZSdLw3crgaQrS2CHb6/hoU/MqsT9aUc=; b=q8+FpFMZLVrCdD3yRG7Ju+geYeJQtNa65SRJLXaufBohRLFm+ncXrTih7jd861tqla PFf3ea29tsMFfhTdKk5XmJJiv4Dm/g5PjcYR0fhOm+Y4lbHgCWSgg6UE610twtuiXfhM Ii9ZEJ/tPBUpHfFCI2y0OapKc0b832hrk2H+rrF/2o5Csol4uiUQD40vkqdOI05/FEsi KCp0O4PA7NiqX8kAEZ/HnpzgCw9BXxyraPfPeXfJgfDcjcDr2New9IOUHMfdHT6rSRw2 KfTDDZd/Xy02EfVt7qT7CEhJmmcOYMNV+oFdr8E0tp98AN3df+eN46N0BOsNs9JdltLS 4Kpw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Return-Path: Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org. [209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id x72si749328oia.194.2020.02.10.14.01.17; Mon, 10 Feb 2020 14:01:42 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=NONE sp=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=intel.com Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727477AbgBJV7v (ORCPT + 99 others); Mon, 10 Feb 2020 16:59:51 -0500 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:20034 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727003AbgBJV7v (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Feb 2020 16:59:51 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 Feb 2020 13:59:51 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,426,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="433469425" Received: from sjchrist-coffee.jf.intel.com (HELO linux.intel.com) ([10.54.74.202]) by fmsmga006.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 10 Feb 2020 13:59:49 -0800 Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2020 13:59:49 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson To: Vitaly Kuznetsov Cc: Andy Lutomirski , David Laight , Xiaoyao Li , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , Paolo Bonzini , "x86@kernel.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write Message-ID: <20200210215949.GD2510@linux.intel.com> References: <777C5046-B9DE-4F8C-B04F-28A546AE4A3F@amacapital.net> <20200131200134.GD18946@linux.intel.com> <87y2timmto.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <87y2timmto.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.24 (2015-08-30) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 04, 2020 at 03:47:15PM +0100, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: > Sean Christopherson writes: > > > Exiting to host userspace with "emulation failed" is the other reasonable > > alternative, but that's basically the same as killing the guest. We're > > arguing that, in the extremely unlikely event that there is a workload out > > there that hits this, it's preferable to *maybe* corrupt guest memory and > > log the anomaly in the kernel log, as opposed to outright killing the guest > > with a generic "emulation failed". > > > > FWIW, if I was to cast a vote I'd pick 'kill the guest' one way or > another. "Maybe corrupt guest memory" scares me much more and in many > cases host and guest are different responsibility domains (think > 'cloud'). I'm ok with that route as well. What I don't want to do is add a bunch of logic to inject #AC at this point.