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[209.132.180.67]) by mx.google.com with ESMTP id q6si1240612oth.26.2020.02.13.08.06.22; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 08:06:38 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.132.180.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; dkim=pass header.i=@kernel.org header.s=default header.b=yvcYOAf5; spf=pass (google.com: best guess record for domain of linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org designates 209.132.180.67 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730255AbgBMQFZ (ORCPT + 99 others); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 11:05:25 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:35848 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728495AbgBMPXu (ORCPT ); Thu, 13 Feb 2020 10:23:50 -0500 Received: from localhost (unknown [104.132.1.104]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A0C0924690; Thu, 13 Feb 2020 15:23:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1581607429; bh=wfrSAr0KNk13gs0Ou2qSbGuJ1cF9Av2hKMxs2i1xMyk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=yvcYOAf5RWcfhEzkQfiqIhh0YaG2abhGJWwgWqi9loUAjtncCBw3jhF6IpCzH0328 9qvzwDOE8iAeKliAf1CuyZCa4JkbooWRrkbYUm7iV4QcJmPoCoCWR9PFxwCGD5XHpb bTZK6KgwsDZBGcdatKZghWyyp6oURh2wOBRz/yK0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Nick Finco , Marios Pomonis , Andrew Honig , Jim Mattson , Paolo Bonzini Subject: [PATCH 4.9 045/116] KVM: x86: Protect DR-based index computations from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2020 07:19:49 -0800 Message-Id: <20200213151900.549837543@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.0 In-Reply-To: <20200213151842.259660170@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20200213151842.259660170@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Marios Pomonis commit ea740059ecb37807ba47b84b33d1447435a8d868 upstream. This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and kvm_get_dr(). Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security perspective. Fixes: 020df0794f57 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code") Signed-off-by: Nick Finco Signed-off-by: Marios Pomonis Reviewed-by: Andrew Honig Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -889,9 +889,11 @@ static u64 kvm_dr6_fixed(struct kvm_vcpu static int __kvm_set_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long val) { + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db); + switch (dr) { case 0 ... 3: - vcpu->arch.db[dr] = val; + vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)] = val; if (!(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP)) vcpu->arch.eff_db[dr] = val; break; @@ -928,9 +930,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_dr); int kvm_get_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int dr, unsigned long *val) { + size_t size = ARRAY_SIZE(vcpu->arch.db); + switch (dr) { case 0 ... 3: - *val = vcpu->arch.db[dr]; + *val = vcpu->arch.db[array_index_nospec(dr, size)]; break; case 4: /* fall through */